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Abstract—The blockchain technology is believed by many to
be a game changer in many application domains, especially
financial applications. While the first generation of blockchain
technology (i.e., Blockchain 1.0) is almost exclusively used for
cryptocurrency purposes, the second generation (i.e., Blockchain
2.0), as represented by Ethereum, is an open and decentralized
platform enabling a new paradigm of computing — Decentralized
Applications (DApps) running on top of blockchains. The rich
applications and semantics of DApps inevitably introduce many
security vulnerabilities, which have no counterparts in pure
cryptocurrency systems like Bitcoin. Since Ethereum is a new,
yet complex, system, it is imperative to have a systematic and
comprehensive understanding on its security from a holistic
perspective, which is unavailable. To the best of our knowledge,
the present survey, which can also be used as a tutorial, fills this
void. In particular, we systematize three aspects of Ethereum
systems security: vulnerabilities, attacks, and defenses. We draw
insights into, among other things, vulnerability root causes, attack
consequences, and defense capabilities, which shed light on future
research directions.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Ethereum, Security, Smart Con-
tract, Vulnerabilities, Attacks, Defenses
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of blockchain was implicitly introduced in 2008
as the key underlying technique of the cryptocurrency known
as Bitcoin [1], which uses a transaction-centered model known
as unspent transaction outputs (UTXO). In this model, a
blockchain is a distributed and public ledger, which records
the payment transactions between parties over a peer-to-peer
(P2P) network. Unlike traditional digital cash systems [2], in
which there is a trusted third party (e.g., bank), there is no
trusted third party in a blockchain system in general and in
Bitcoin in particular. Bitcoin is often referred to as Blockchain
1.0 because it only offers payment services. The innovation
of the Bitcoin system is its consensus protocol, which allows
mutually distrusting nodes in a P2P network to eventually
reach a consensus on the outcome after executing payment
transactions. Unlike traditional consensus protocols [3], the
participants are from an open network and are incentivized by
the payment of Bitcoins (or BTCs), which are “mined” through
a clever cryptographic hash function known as Proof-of-Work
(PoW), an idea originally proposed as an anti-spam technique
[4].
Perhaps inspired by the success of Bitcoin as well as
the need to support semantically richer (than just payment)
applications, the notion of smart contracts has been introduced
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to represent autonomous programs, leading to a new paradigm
of Decentralized Applications (DApps) that run on top of
blockchains and consist of many interacting smart contracts.
The Ethereum system was launched in 2015 to support smart
contracts, while offering its inherent cryptocurrency known as
Ether [5] and using an account-centered model (rather than
the UTXO model mentioned above). Ethereum has become
the de facto standard platform for DApps. At the moment
of writing, the market value of Ethereum is over US$31B
with approximately one million smart contracts executing on
top of the Ethereum blockchain [6], [7]. The success of
Ethereum ushers in Blockchain 2.0, which goes much beyond
the payment-centered Blockchain 1.0.
While Ethereum facilitates semantically richer applications
than Bitcoin, it also enlarges the threat surface, as evidenced
by the many high-profile attacks. One example is the DAO [8]
attack in year 2016, in which case an attacker exploited the so-
called reentrancy vulnerability (which will be detailed later)
to steal approximately US$60M. In July 2017, a vulnerability
in the Parity wallet contract caused the loss of US$31M [9].
In April 2018, the MyEtherWallet wallet fell victim to a
BGP and DNS hijacking attack, enabling the hacker to steal
approximately US$17M [10]. These attacks highlight that our
capabilities in securing the Ethereum system are limited. This
should not be taken as a surprise because Ethereum is a
new programming paradigm with DApps running on top of
blockchains with many autonomous contracts.
The motivation of the present survey is in three-fold of
researchers, practitioners, and students. From the standpoint
of a researcher who wants to investigate Ethereum security,
there is a need for a source of systematized treatment on the
problems related to Ethereum security. Despite the fact that
there have been some surveys, they did not offer a systematic
and comprehensive view on Ethereum vulnerabilities, attacks,
and defenses as we do. While referring to the related prior
work in Section I-B for details, we mention the following:
there is neither systematic understanding of the Ethereum
vulnerabilities that have been discovered, nor systematic un-
derstanding of their root causes; this may explain why there are
still a number of vulnerabilities that are completely open. From
the standpoint of a practitioner, there is a need for a source of
best practices and guiding principles. Industry has conducted
due diligence in summarizing many best practices [11], which
however may overwhelm practitioners. Therefore, it might be
more useful to have a small number of guiding principles that
are easier to adopt in practice. From the standpoint of a student
who wants to learn about Ethereum security, there is a need
for a succinct yet comprehensive and systematic source that
also offer references to materials of greater details.
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2A. Our contributions
We provide a systematic and comprehensive survey on
Ethereum systems security. It is systematic in the sense that
vulnerabilities, attacks, and defenses as well as the relation-
ships between them are accommodated. It is comprehensive
in the sense that it covers both the Ethereum platform via
a layered architecture and the environment in which the
Ethereum platform operates. In terms of vulnerabilities, we
enumerate 44 types of Ethereum vulnerabilities according to
the layers of the Ethereum architecture and the environment in
which Ethereum operates. Perhaps more importantly, we ana-
lyze and systematize the root causes of those vulnerabilities.
This allows us to provide insights into how to prevent some
Ethereum vulnerabilities and how to cope with the inevitable
vulnerabilities, including those that are largely open. Some of
our findings and insights are highlighted as follows:
1) Ethereum smart contracts introduce new kinds of vul-
nerabilities that do not have counterparts in traditional
paradigm of applications.
2) It is important to design more secure programming
languages and supporting tools for programmers to write
more secure smart contracts.
3) The vulnerabilities caused by the design and implemen-
tation of the Ethereum blockchain are harder to cope
with than vulnerabilities in the traditional paradigm.
4) The vulnerabilities in the Ethereum environment are
largely caused by human, usability, and networking
factors.
5) There are many vulnerabilities (e.g., outsourceable puz-
zle, 51% hashrate, and under-priced opcodes) that must
be tackled in order to adequately defend Ethereum or
blockchain-based DApp systems in general.
In terms of attacks, we systematize 26 attacks against
Ethereum according to the layers of the Ethereum architecture.
Perhaps more importantly, we relate these attacks to the
vulnerabilities and systematize the attack consequences. Some
of our findings are highlighted as follows:
1) The largest single-incident financial loss thus far was
caused by a denial-of-service (DoS) attack against the
Parity wallet. This attack disabled a library that is used
by many contracts and is therefore quite different from
traditional DoS attacks.
2) DApps running on top of blockchains are not fully
decentralized when they use centralized web interfaces,
even if the underlying blockchain is fully decentralized.
3) Ethereum application-layer attacks have caused the
largest financial losses.
In terms of defenses, we systematize 47 defenses into two
classes: proactive defenses, which aim to prevent attacks as
much as possible; and reactive defenses, which aim to cope
with the hidden vulnerabilities (i.e., their existence may not
be known to the defender). Perhaps more importantly, we
present a deeper analysis of the defenses according to (i) their
capabilities in mitigating the damages that can be incurred by
exploiting vulnerabilities, and (ii) the defense effort that has
been investigated to cope with each kind of vulnerabilities.
Some of our findings are highlighted as follows:
1) Industry has come up with a significant set of best
practices for guiding the development of smart contracts.
These best practices, if adequately executed, can indeed
avoid many vulnerabilities.
2) Existing proactive defenses can defend against attacks
that exploit many vulnerabilities; in contrast, existing
reactive defenses can only defend against attacks that
exploit a few vulnerabilities.
3) There are large discrepancies between levels of effort
and investment into different kinds of attacks (i.e., much
more investment into defending against high-profile at-
tacks than low-profile attacks).
4) Existing studies focus on defending against attacks that
attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the DApp back-end
(i.e., smart contracts), but largely ignore the protection
of the DApp front-end (i.e., browser) and the interactions
between the front-end and the back-end.
Although the present paper focuses on the Ethereum system,
the aforementioned findings related to vulnerabilities, attacks
and defenses might be applicable to blockchain-based systems
in general. Moreover, we discuss some fundamental research
problems that must be adequately tackled in order to secure
and defend Ethereum and blockchain-based systems, includ-
ing:
1) There is a lack of deep understanding on the rigorously-
defined properties of blockchain-based systems.
2) There is a lack of deep understanding on the rigorous
analysis methodologies that are necessary and sufficient
for analyzing the desired properties of blockchain-based
systems.
3) There is a lack of deep understanding on the metrics that
are necessary and sufficient for analyzing the security
and risk of blockchain-based systems.
In order to improve readability and ease the reference to the
large number of vulnerabilities, we denote the vulnerabilities
by 1,… ,44, respectively. Similarly, we respectively denotethe attacks by 1,… ,26 and the defenses by 1,… , 퐷47.Moreover, we use “푖(푗 ,⋯)” to denote that attack 푖exploits vulnerabilities 푗 and possibly others.The preceding discussion justifies how the present paper
would adequately serve the needs of students and researchers.
For practitioners, we mention that we systematize the best
practices into a small number of principles that may be easier
to adopt in practice.
B. Related work
Table I highlights the relationship between the present
work and related prior surveys, which accommodate some
of vulnerabilities, attacks, defenses, and building-blocks. The
most closely related survey is Atzei et al. [12], which discussed
12 types of vulnerabilities, 9 attacks, and 3 defenses in the
context of Ethereum smart contracts (i.e. Blockchain 2.0). In
contrast, we present a much more systematic treatment, by
accommodating 44 types of vulnerabilities, 26 attacks, and
47 defenses. From a methodological standpoint, we further
discuss the root causes of vulnerabilities (e.g., the root cause of
the unchecked call return value vulnerability is the inconsistent
3TABLE I: Comparison between surveys related to blockchain security and privacy.
Study
Vulnerabilities Attacks Defenses Building-blocks
Blockchain 1.0 Blockchain 2.0 Insights Blockchain 1.0 Blockchain 2.0 Insights Blockchain 1.0 Blockchain 2.0 Insights Cryptography Consensus
[12] 12 9 3
This work 44 ✓ 26 ✓ 47 ✓
[13] 20 6 5
[14] 11 11 30
[15] 22 ✓ 33 yes
[16] 10 ✓
[17] 27 ✓
[18] yes
[19], [20], [21], [22] yes
exception handling of Solidity). Moreover, we draw insights
from the perspectives of vulnerability, attack, and defense.
There are a number of surveys on blockchain security
and privacy which however have different perspectives than
ours. First, Li et al. [13] reviewed security of blockchain
technologies through the lens of 20 types of vulnerabili-
ties, 6 attacks, and 5 defenses, without distinction between
Blockchain 1.0 and 2.0 aspects. Similarly, Zhu et al. [14]
reviewed 11 smart contract vulnerabilities, 11 attacks against
blockchain data, and 30 defenses. On the contrary, we focus on
the Ethereum blockchain system by accommodating 44 types
of vulnerabilities, 26 attacks, and 47 defenses.
Second, Saad et al. [15] explored blockchains’ attack surface
in terms of cryptographic constructions, distributed system
architecture, and applications; they cover 22 attacks and 33
defenses in Blockchain 1.0 and 2.0, but not vulnerabilities.
Their survey is orthogonal to ours because (i) we focus on
the Ethereum system, rather than multiple implementations
of blockchains; (ii) we discuss vulnerabilities and their root
causes as well as the attacks exploiting them, rather than
attack surface; (iii) we provide insights into, and contrast, the
vulnerabilities at different layers of the Ethereum architecture.
Third, Harz et al. [16] discussed 10 smart contract verifi-
cation tools. Similarly, Angelo et al. [17] discussed 27 tools
for analyzing Ethereum smart contracts. On the contrary, we
focus on the defenses of the Ethereum systems security, rather
than purely on smart contracts.
Fourth, Zhang et al. [18] presented a comprehensive re-
view on Bitcoin-like transactions and the underlying (cryp-
tographic) mechanisms. Their review is geared towards the
abstract blockchain model for Bitcoin-like transactions (i.e.,
Blockchain 1.0); in contrast, we focus on the Ethereum
ecosystem, including the design and implementation of the
blockchain platform and DApps. There are surveys that focus
on Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies [23], [24], [25], which use
a transaction-centered model known as unspent transaction
outputs (UTXO). In contrast, we focus on Ethereum, which
uses an account-centered model.
Fifth, Orthogonal to the purpose of the present survey
and tutorial, there are several surveys purely on blockchain
consensus protocols [19], [20], [21], [22]. In contrast, we focus
on the overall Ethereum system.
C. Paper outline
Section II briefly reviews the Ethereum system and dis-
cusses the survey methodology. Section III presents the
44 Ethereum vulnerabilities according to the layers of the
Ethereum architecture and a deeper analysis of their root
causes. Section IV presents the 26 attacks against Ethereum
and a deeper analysis on their consequences. Section V
presents the 47 defenses, classified as proactive or reactive
and a deeper analysis on their capabilities and investments.
Section VI discuss future research directions towards securing
blockchain-based systems, including Ethereum as a special
case. Section VII conclude the present paper.
II. ETHEREUM REVIEW AND SURVEY METHODOLOGY
A. A brief review of the Ethereum system
Figure 1 highlights a 4-layer architecture of the Ethereum
blockchain, operates across these 4 layers. At the application
layer, Ethereum clients execute smart contracts, which are
associated to Ethereum accounts, in EVM. The data layer con-
tains the blockchain data structures. The consensus layer as-
sures a consistent state of the blockchain. Note that Ethereum
plans to replace its current use of Proof-of-Work (PoW)
with a Proof-of-Stake (PoS). The network layer formulates a
Ethereum peer-to-peer (P2P) network of nodes or clients such
that a node can always get the updated state of the blockchain
from some of the active nodes. The environment serves these
4 layers via a corresponding component: a web user interface
to interact with applications; databases for storing blockchain
data; cryptographic mechanisms for supporting the consensus
protocols; and Internet service for the network layer.
1) The application layer: Ethereum supports two types
of accounts: externally owned accounts (EOA) and contract
accounts. An EOA is used to keep a user’s funds in Wei,
which is the smallest subdenomination of Ether and is worth
10−18 Ether. An EOA is associated with, and addressed by,
a public key; access to an EOA is authenticated by showing
the ownership of the corresponding private key. In contrast, a
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Fig. 1: Architecture of the Ethereum blockchain and its envi-
ronment in which the Ethereum blockchain runs.
contract account is associated with a piece of executable byte-
code (i.e., smart contracts), which defines some business logic
of interest. An EOA or contract account has a dynamic state,
which is defined by: (i) 푛표푛푐푒, which tracks the number of
transactions that have been initiated by the owner of the EOA
or the number of contracts created by the contract account;
(ii) 푏푎푙푎푛푐푒, which is the amount of Wei (i.e., 10−18 Ether)
owned by the EOA or contract account; (iii) 푠푡표푟푎푔푒푅표표푡,
which is the hash of the root of the account’s storage data
structure trie that records a contract’s state variables associated
to the corresponding piece of bytecode (i.e., not applicable to
EOA); (iv) 푐표푑푒퐻푎푠ℎ, which is the hash value of a contract
account’s bytecode (i.e., not applicable to EOA). The state of
a blockchain is defined by the states of the accounts on the
blockchain.
Smart contracts are building-blocks of decentralized appli-
cations (DApps) running on top of the Ethereum blockchain.
A DApp often has a user interface as its front-end and some
smart contracts as its back-end. At the moment of writing,
2,497 DApps are running on top of Ethereum, including
finance, governance, gambling, exchange, and wallet appli-
cations [26]. Some DApps issue their own cryptocurrency,
called tokens, for purposes like Initial Coin Offering (ICO)
and exchanges. A Ethereum-based token is a special kind of
smart contract (e.g., ERC-20 [27]).
Smart contracts execute in EVMs, which are quasi-Turing-
complete machines using a stack-based architecture; the term
“quasi” means that the execution is limited by the amount of
gas offered by the transaction in question [28].
2) The data layer: A transaction is an interaction between
an EOA (called sender) and anther EOA or contract account
(called recipient). A transaction is specified by: (i) 푛표푛푐푒,
which is a counter for tracking the total number of transactions
that have been initiated by the sender; (ii) 푟푒푐푖푝푖푒푛푡, which
specifies a transaction’s destination EOA or contract account;
(iii) 푣푎푙푢푒, which is the amount of money (unit: Wei) to be
transferred from the sender to the recipient (if applicable);
(iv) 푖푛푝푢푡, which is the bytecode or data corresponding to the
purpose of the transaction; (v) 푔푎푠푃 푟푖푐푒 and 푔푎푠퐿푖푚푖푡, which
respectively specify the unit price and the maximum amount
of gas the sender is willing to pay the winning miner of a block
containing the transaction; (vi) (푣, 푟, 푠), which is the Elliptic
Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signature of the
sender. The execution of a transaction updates the states of the
accounts involved and therefore the state of the blockchain.
Figure 2 depicts the lifecycle of a transaction. (i) A sender
constructs a transaction and digitally signs it. (ii) The sender
submits the signed transaction to an Ethereum client via a
JSON-RPC call. (iii) The client validates the received trans-
action and broadcasts it to the Ethereum P2P network. (iv)
Any client that receives the transaction and is a miner adds
the transaction to its transaction pool. (v) A miner executes
a sequence of transactions chosen from its transaction pool,
formulates a new block, and updates the state of the blockchain
as follows. For a money-transfer transaction, the speci-
fied 푣푎푙푢푒 is transferred from the sender’s EOA to the recipi-
ent’s EOA or contract account; for a contract-creation
transaction where 푖푛푝푢푡 is a piece of bytecode, a new contract
account is created and is associated with the bytecode; for a
contract-invocation transaction where 푟푒푐푖푝푖푒푛푡 is a
callee contract and 푖푛푝푢푡 uniquely identifies the callee func-
tion (and possibly some associated arguments), the bytecode
associated to the callee contract account is loaded into the
EVM. (vi) The miner solves a PoW by finding a random nonce
such that the hash value of the block metadata in question is
smaller than a certain threshold, which reflects the difficulty
of creating a block. Unlike Bitcoin’s computation-intense PoW
[1], Ethereum uses a memory-intense puzzle called “Ethash”
[5]. (vii) Upon creating a block, the miner broadcasts it to the
Ethereum P2P network so that other clients can validate the
block. (viii) Upon validating a block, the client in question
appends the block to the blockchain.
Trie [5] is the data structure for storing Ethereum blockchain
data (e.g., account states). Like a Patricia tree [29], a trie stores
(푘푒푦, 푣푎푙푢푒) pairs while facilitating search as follows: the path
from the root to a leaf node corresponds to a 푘푒푦 and the
leaf node contains a 푣푎푙푢푒 (e.g., the state of an account). As
illustrated in Figure 3, a block header may point to a state
trie, a transaction trie (for bookkeeping transaction data), and
a receipt trie (for bookkeeping the data related to the execution
of transactions). Each contract account corresponding to a leaf
or branch node on the state trie uses a separate storage trie
to bookkeep the persistent data of the contract; this storage
trie also use a (푘푒푦, 푣푎푙푢푒) structure, where the position of
each slot corresponds to a 푘푒푦 and the contract’s state variable
in each slot corresponds to a 푣푎푙푢푒. Note that an Ethereum
blockchain has a single state trie because the state of the
blockchain dynamically evolves.
3) The consensus layer: At the moment of writing,
Ethereum takes about 14 seconds to create a block, meaning
that multiple miners could create valid blocks simultaneously
and that there could be many stale blocks. Ethereum uses
a variant of the GHOST consensus protocol [30] to select
the “heaviest” branch as the main chain where the “heaviest”
branch is the sub-tree rooted at the fork in question and has
the highest cumulative block difficulty [31], [32], while noting
that stale blocks are not on the main chain.
Ethereum rewards not only the regular blocks on the main
chain, but also the stale blocks referred by a regular block.
As illustrated in Figure 4, an uncle block is a stale block
referenced by a regular block called nephew (via a dashed
arrow). The distance between two blocks is their height
difference on the tree. The miner of a regular block receives
one unit of “static block reward,” which is worthy of 2 Ethers
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at the time of writing. In order to incentivize referencing to
uncle blocks, the miner of a nephew regular block further
receives 1∕32 of the static block reward for a reference (and
for up to 2 references). The miner of the referenced uncle
block is rewarded with 1 − 푑∕8 of the static block reward,
where 1 ≤ 푑 ≤ 6 is the distance between the uncle block and
the referencing nephew block. Miners of regular blocks also
receive the gas fee specified by the transactions in question.
1a 2b 3b 4b 5a
+5/8
2c
2a 3a 4a
+7/8
+1+(1/32)
6b
+1 +1 +1 +1+1+(2/32)
+6/8
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Stale & Uncle blockStale block 
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Fig. 4: A sub-tree of an Ethereum blockchain (adapted from
[33]), where a value beneath a node is the total award to the
miner of the node (unit: static block reward).
4) The network layer: The Ethereum network is a structured
P2P network where each node (i.e., client) stores a copy of the
entire blockchain. For node discovery and routing purposes,
each node maintains a dynamic routing table of 160 buckets
and each bucket contains up to 16 entries of other nodes’ IDs,
IP address, UDP/TCP ports. Ethereum uses the RLPx protocol
[34], [35] to discover target clients and uses the Ethereum Wire
Protocol [36] to facilitate the exchange of Ethereum blockchain
information (e.g., transactions, blocks) between clients.
5) The environment: The Ethereum blockchain runs in
an environment, which naturally operates across the 4-layers
to provide respective services, namely: a web interface for
users to interact with the Ethereum blockchain; a database for
Ethereum clients to store the blockchain data; cryptographic
mechanisms for security purposes; and the Internet infras-
tructure to support blockchain networking and communication
among Ethereum nodes. We separate the Ethereum blockchain
architecture from the environment because attacks against the
Ethereum blockchain may come from the environment and
these attacks may be better addressed in the environment
rather than by the Ethereum blockchain, leading to a clean
and modular abstraction.
B. Survey methodology
1) Scope: Since our focus is on Ethereum security, we will
systematize the vulnerabilities of, the attacks against, and the
defenses for Ethereum. Since these aspects are related to the
programming language for writing smart contracts and the
client software, we focus on the widely-used Solidity and Geth
[37] as well as Parity [38], respectively.
2) Methodology: Our methodology can be characterized
as follows. First, we use a layered architecture to present
the Ethereum ecosystem, from the application down to the
data, the consensus, the network, and the environment layers.
This layered view allows us to describe matters at the most
appropriate layer.
Second, we consider security from three perspectives (i.e.,
vulnerabilities, attacks, and defenses) as well as the relation-
ships between them. For each vulnerability, we discuss, among
other things, its root cause and status (i.e., eliminated, can be
eliminated by best practice, or still open). For each attack,
we discuss, among other things, its cause, tactic, and direct
impact. For each defense, we discuss its mechanism and the
(hidden) vulnerabilities it aims to protect from exploitation.
We aim to provide insights into the design and implementation
of Ethereum as well as future research directions in order to
address the range of open problems.
6III. VULNERABILITIES
Figure 5 highlights our classification of Ethereum vul-
nerabilities based on their location, cause, and status (i.e.,
eliminated vs. can be avoided by best practice vs. open). For
ease of reference, we denote the 44 types of vulnerabilities
as 1,… ,44, respectively. In what follows, we group themaccording to location.
A. Vulnerabilities at the application layer
1) Reentrancy (1): This vulnerability was first observedfrom the DAO attack [39]; its variants were later reported
in [40]. The vulnerability occurs when an external callee
contract calls back to a function in the caller contract before
the execution of the caller contract is completed (i.e., cyclic
calls in a sense). This allows the attacker to bypass the due
validity check until the caller contract is drained of Ether or
the transaction runs out of gas. The vulnerability is caused by:
(i) a contract’s control-flow decision relies on some of its state
variable(s) that should be, but are not, updated by the contract
itself before calling another (i.e., an external) contract [40];
and (ii) there is no gas limit when handing the control-flow
to another contract. The vulnerability can be prevented by one
of the following methods [41]: (i) assuring that a contract’s
state variables are updated before calling another contract;
(ii) introducing a mutex lock on the contract state to assure
that only the lock owner can change the state; (iii) using the
transfer method to send money to other contracts because this
method only forwards 2,300 gas to the callee contract.
2) Delegatecall injection (2): This vulnerability was firstobserved from an attack against the Parity wallet [42]. In
order to facilitate code-reuse, EVM provides an opcode, DEL-
EGATECALL, for embedding a callee contract’s bytecode into
the bytecode of the caller contract as if it’s a piece of the
latter’s bytecode [43]. As a consequence, a malicious callee
contract can directly modify (or manipulate) the state variables
of the caller contract. This vulnerability is caused by the ability
that the state variables of a caller contract can be updated by
the bytecode of a callee contract. The vulnerability can be
completely prevented by declaring a contract that is meant to
be shared via the delegatecall as a library, which is stateless
[44].
3) Frozen Ether (3): This vulnerability was first observedfrom another attack against the Parity wallet [45]. The vul-
nerability results from the ability of users to deposit their
money to their contract accounts with the inability to spend
their money from those accounts, effectively freezing their
money. The vulnerability is caused by [46]: (i) contracts not
providing any function for spending money relying on the
money-spending function of another contract (as a library)
and (ii) the callee contract (i.e., the library) being killed
accidentally or deliberately. The vulnerability can be prevented
by assuring that mission-critical functions, or money-spending
functions in this case, are not outsourced to another contract.
4) Upgradable contract (4): This vulnerability was firstdiscussed in [12]. The idea of contract upgrading was in-
troduced to mitigate the problem that smart contracts, once
deployed, cannot be modified even if they are later found to
have vulnerabilities. In order to allow contract upgrading, there
are two approaches: (i) splitting a contract into a proxy contract
and a logic contract such that developers can upgrade the
latter but not the former; and (ii) using a registry contract
to bookkeep the updated contracts. While effective, these
approaches introduce a new vulnerability: when the contract
developer is malicious, the updated (logic) contract can be
malicious. The vulnerability is caused by one contract being
able to call another contract, which can be malicious. This
vulnerability (i.e., unsecure contact updating) remains to be
an open problem.
5) DoS with unexpected revert (5): This vulnerability wasfirst reported in [41]. It occurs either when a transaction is
reverted due to a caller contract encountering a failure in
an external call, or the callee contract deliberately performs
the revert operation to disrupt the execution of the caller
contract. This vulnerability is caused by the execution of
a caller contract being reverted by a callee contract. This
vulnerability can be prevented by letting a recipient invoke
a transaction to “pull” the money that was set aside by a
sender for the recipient, which effectively prevents a sender’s
transaction from being reverted [47].
6) Integer overflow and underflow (6): This vulnerabilitywas first observed from the attack against the BEC tokens
[48]. It occurs when the result of an arithmetic operation
falls outside of the range of a Solidity data type, causing (for
example) unauthorized manipulation to the attacker’s balance
[48] or other state variables. The vulnerability is caused by
that Solidity source code does not perform proper validation
on numeric inputs, and that neither the Solidity compiler nor
the EVM enforces integer overflow/underflow detection. This
vulnerability can be prevented by using the SafeMath library
[49] that handles these issues.
7) Manipulated balance (7): This vulnerability was firstreported in [50] and was also known as the “forcing Ether
to contracts” vulnerability. This vulnerability occurs when
a contract’s control-flow decision relies on the value of
this.balance or address(this).balance, which can be
leveraged by an attacker to cause (for example) that only
the attacker can obtain the money; see [44] for a detailed
description. This vulnerability can be prevented by not using
a contract’s balance in any condition check [50].
8) Authentication through tx.origin (8): This vulnera-bility was first discussed in [51]. The tx.origin is a global
variable in Solidity and refers to the original EOA that initiates
the transaction in question. This vulnerability occurs when
a contract uses tx.origin for authorization, which can be
compromised by a phishing attack. Figure 6 provides an
example of this vulnerability (Line 6) in function withdrawAll,
which uses tx.origin to confirm that it is the owner of
contract UserWallet that is calling the function. However,
if the owner of contract UserWallet is tricked to transfer
money to a malicious AttackContract, the fallback func-
tion (Line 14) will be automatically executed, which in turn
calls the withdrawAll() function. Since the condition check
(Line 6) validates the EOA that initiated the transaction rather
than the intermediate caller (i.e., AttackContract), the
attacker can pass the authority check and steal the money in
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Fig. 5: A classification of Ethereum vulnerabilities and their state-of-the-art treatments (■ means “eliminated already”, ◨
means “can be avoided by best practice”, and □ means open (i.e., has yet to be eliminated).
contract UserWallet. This vulnerability can be prevented by
using msg.sender, instead of tx.origin, for authentication
[52] because msg.sender returns the account that incurred
the message.
9) Erroneous visibility (9): This vulnerability was firstobserved in an attack against the Parity wallet [42]. It occurs
when a function’s visibility is incorrectly specified and thus
permits unauthorized access. Specifically, Solidity provides
four types of visibility to restrict access to a contract’s func-
tions, namely public, external, internal, and private,
which respectively says a function can be called arbitrarily,
only externally, only internally (i.e., within the contract and
its derived contracts), or only within the contract. Functions
that should not be called from an external contract should
be specified as private or internal. However, Solidity
makes functions as public by default, which allows attackers
to directly call these improperly specified functions. Solidity
1 contract UserWallet { // vulnerable contract
2 address owner;
3 constructor() public { owner = msg.sender; }
4 ...
5 function withdrawAll(address addr) public {
6 require(tx.origin == owner);
7 addr.transfer(this.balance);
8 }
9 }
10
11 contract AttackContract { // malicious phishing contract
12 address attacker;
13 function () payable {
14 UserWallet(msg.sender).withdrawAll(attacker);
15 }
16 }
Fig. 6: The tx.origin vulnerability and its exploitations.
8(starting version 0.5.0) mitigates the vulnerability by making
it mandatory for programmers to explicitly specify function
visibility [53]. Still, this vulnerability cannot be completely
prevented unless programmers correctly specify their func-
tions’ visibilities.
10) Unprotected suicide (10): This vulnerability was firstobserved from an attack against the Parity wallet [45]. A
contract account can be killed by the contract’s owner (or a
trusted third party) using the suicide or self-destruct method.
A contract may have an “owner” whose privileges are typically
specified when creating the contract. When a contract account
is killed, its associated contract bytecode and storage are
deleted forever. This vulnerability is caused by the inadequate
authentication enforced by a contract. The vulnerability can
be mitigated by enforcing advanced authentication (e.g, multi-
factor authentication) to assure that a suicide operation must
be approved by multiple parties [54].
11) Leaking Ether to arbitrary address (11): This vul-nerability was first reported in [55]. The vulnerability occurs
when a contract’s funds can be withdrawn by any caller, who
is neither the owner of the contract nor an investor who
deposited funds to the contract. This vulnerability is caused
by the failure in checking an caller’s identity when the caller
invokes a function to send Ether to an arbitrary address.
This vulnerability can be prevented by enforcing an adequate
authentication on the functions for sending funds.
12) Secrecy failure (12): This vulnerability was first ob-served from a multi-player game in [56] and was also called
keeping secrets in [12]. It can be exploited to benefit an
attacker. In blockchain, restricting the visibility of a variable
or function does not assure that the variable or function is
secret, because of the public nature of blockchain (i.e., details
of transactions are publicly known). Although restricting a
state variable to be private can prevent other contracts from
accessing it, any one can see the value of a state variable from
the relevant transaction data. This vulnerability is caused by
the lack of secrecy of sensitive data in an untrusted environ-
ment. A possible solution to preventing this vulnerability is
to use cryptographic techniques, such as timed commitments
[56], [12].
13) Insufficient signature information (13): This vulner-ability was first exploited in a replay attack against smart
contracts [57]. The vulnerability occurs when a digital sig-
nature turns out to be valid for multiple transactions, which
can happen when one sender (say Alice) sends money to mul-
tiple recipients through a proxy contract (instead of initiating
multiple transactions) [58]. In the proxy contract mechanism,
Alice can send a digitally signed message off-chain (e.g. via
email) to the recipients, similar to writing personal checks in
the real world, to let the recipients withdraw money from the
proxy contract via transactions. In order to assure that Alice
does approve a certain payment, the proxy contract verifies
the validity of the digital signature in question. However, if the
signature does not give the due information (e.g., nonce, proxy
contract address), a malicious recipient can replay the message
multiple times to withdraw extra payments. This vulnerability
can be prevented by incorporating the due information in each
message [59].
14) DoS with unbounded operations (14): This vulnerabil-ity was first observed from the GovernMental contract [60]
and its variants were later discussed in [61], [62]. Recall that
each block has a “gas limit” field that specifies the maximum
total amount of gas that can be consumed by the transactions
in a block. This vulnerability occurs when the amount of gas
that is required for executing a contract exceeds the block gas
limit. This vulnerability is caused by improper programming
with unbounded operations in a contract (e.g., loop over a
large array). This vulnerability can be mitigated by assuring (i)
contracts should not use loops over data structures, especially
those data structures that can be operated by EOA; and (ii)
when a contract has to use loop over data structure, the contract
should keep track of the loop and resume the aborted execution
when the sender of the transaction re-invokes the same contract
(in order to finish the execution of the contract) [61].
15) Unchecked call return value (15): This vulnerabil-ity was first discussed in [63], [54] and is also known as
mishandled exceptions. It has two variants, called gasless
send and unchecked send [12], [64]. Recall that Solidity
provides two methods for a contract to call another: (i) directly
referencing to a callee contract’s instance; (ii) using one of the
following four low-level methods: send, call, delegatecall
and callcode. There is a discrepancy in Solidity’s handling of
exceptions occurring in the execution of callee contracts [63]:
if an exception occurs in case (i), the exception is automatically
propagated back to the caller and the transaction is reverted
entirely; if an exception occurs in case (ii), the callee contract
returns FALSE back to the caller contract. This discrepancy
can lead to unintended transactions unless the caller contract
carefully addresses the discrepancy. At the moment of writing,
neither the Solidity compiler nor the EVM addresses the
discrepancy. This vulnerability can be prevented by letting a
caller contract check and address the discrepancy mentioned
above.
16) Uninitialized storage pointer (16): This vulnerabilitywas first reported in [65]. Recall that in Solidity, the contract
state variables are always laid out consecutively in storage,
starting from slot 0. For a complicated local variable (e.g.,
struct, array, or mapping), a reference is assigned to an unoccu-
pied slot in the storage to point to the state variable. If the local
variable is not explicitly initialized, then the local variable’s
reference points to slot 0 by default, causing the content
starting from slot 0 to be overwritten [66]. This vulnerability
is caused by Solidity’s treatment of uninitialized complicated
local variables. This vulnerability has been eliminated by
Solidity compiler, starting version 0.5.0, by reporting an error
to contracts that contain uninitialized storage pointers [53].
17) Erroneous constructor name (17): This vulnerabilitywas first observed from the Rubixi contract [67], where
the constructor function has an incorrect name that allows
anyone to become the owner of the contract. Prior to Solidity
version 0.4.22, a function declared with the same name as the
contract’s is considered as the contract’s constructor, which is
only executed one-time upon the creation of the contract. If the
constructor’s name is misspelled by a programmer for what-
ever reason, the intended constructor becomes a public, normal
function that can be invoked by any EOA. This vulnerability
9is caused by that Solidity does not provide a special syntax
to distinguish a constructor function from a regular function
[68]. The vulnerability has been eliminated, starting Solidity
version 0.4.22, by introducing the new keyword constructor
[69].
1 contract CounterLibrary { function add(uint) public returns (uint) }
2 contract CounterLib { function add(uint) public returns (uint) }
3 contract Game {
4 function play(CounterLibrary c) public {
5 c.add(1);
6 }
7 }
Fig. 7: The type casts vulnerability.
18) Type casts (18): This vulnerability was first reportedin [12]. Recall that a contract written in the Solidity lan-
guage can call another contract by directly referencing to the
callee contract’s instance. As illustrated in Figure 7, contract
Game calls the function add() in contract CounterLibrary
by referencing to its instance c (Line 5). When function
play() (Line 4) is invoked, the argument specifying the callee
contract’s address is cast to CounterLibrary. However,
the Solidity compiler can only check whether or not the
CounterLibrary contract declared function add(), but
cannot check whether or not the address argument conforms
to that of the CounterLibrary contract’s. If the address
associated to the CounterLib contract (Line 2) contains
a function that is named add() and has the same declara-
tion, then the add() function in contract CounterLib is
executed, instead of the desired add() function in contract
CounterLibrary. As a consequence, the EVM can be
misled to run the attacker’s contract. This vulnerability is
caused by the incompetent type system of Solidity. Currently,
there is no feasible way to avoid the vulnerability.
19) Outdated compiler version (19): This vulnerabilitywas first reported in [54]. It occurs when a contract uses
an outdated compiler, which contains bugs and thus makes
a compiled contract vulnerable. This vulnerability can be
prevented by using an up-to-date compiler.
20) Short address (20): This vulnerability was first dis-cussed in [70]. Recall that in a contract-invocation
transaction, the function selector and arguments are orderly
encoded in the input field, where the first four bytes specify
the callee function and the rest data arranges arguments in
chunks of 32 bytes. However, if the length of the encoded
arguments is shorter than expected, EVM will auto-pad extra
zeros to the arguments to make up for 32 bytes. Consider
function transfer(address addr, uint tokens) as an example.
If the trailing one (i.e., last) byte of addr is left off, two extra
hex zeros will be added to the end of tokens, which amplifies
the number of tokens being sent. This vulnerability is caused
by that EVM does not check the validity of addresses [71].
This vulnerability can be prevented by checking the length of
a transaction’s input (i.e., msg.data) [72].
21) Ether lost to orphan address (21): This vulnerabilitywas first reported in [12]. When transferring money, Ethereum
only checks whether the length of the recipient’s address is
no greater than 160-bit but not the validity of the recipient’s
address. If money is sent to a non-existing orphan address,
Ethereum automatically registers for the address than termi-
nating the transaction. Since the address is not associated to
any EOA or contract account, there is no way to withdraw the
transferred money, which is effectively lost. This vulnerability
is caused by that EVM is not orphan-proof. At the moment of
writing, this vulnerability can only be prevented by manually
assuring the correctness of the recipient’s address.
22) Call-stack depth limit (22): This vulnerability was firstreported in [73]. Recall that in the original specification of
Ethereum execution model [5], EVM’s call-stack has a hard
limit of 1024 frames. When a contract calls another contract,
the call-stack depth of the transaction increases by one; when
the number of nested calls exceeds 1024, Solidity throws an
exception and aborts the call. An attacker can recursively call
a contract, which may be deployed by the attacker, for 1023
times and then calls a victim contract to reach the stack depth
limit, which fails any subsequent external call made by the
victim contract. Since Solidity does not propagate exceptions
in low-level external calls, the victim contract may not be
aware of the failure. This vulnerability is caused by EVM’s
inadequate execution model, and has been eliminated by the
hard fork for EIP-150, which re-defines the gas-consumption
rules of external calls to make it impossible to reach 1024 in
call stack depth [74].
23) Under-priced opcodes (23): This vulnerability wasfirst observed from two DoS attacks [75], [76], [77]. Recall
that Ethereum uses the gas mechanism to prevent the abuse of
computing resources (e.g., CPU, disk, network). This vulner-
ability occurs when a contract contains a lot of under-priced
opcodes that consume a large amount of resources at a low
gas cost, meaning that the execution of the contract wastes
a lot of computing resources. This vulnerability is caused
by the failure in properly setting the gas cost for consuming
computing resources. In order to mitigate this vulnerability,
Ethereum has raised the gas cost for the opcodes that were
abused to launch the two DoS attacks described in [74].
However, it is not clearly whether or not the vulnerability can
be completely prevented by this mechanism or not [77].
24) Transaction ordering dependence (a.k.a. front running;24): This vulnerability was first discussed in [63]. It refers tothe concurrency issue that the forthcoming state of blockchain
depends on the execution order of transactions, which is how-
ever determined by the miners. Typically, miners group and
order transactions into a new block based on the reward offered
by the transactions. Since transactions are publicly broadcast
to the network, a malicious EOA can offer a higher gasPrice
to have its transactions assembled into blocks sooner than the
others’. Moreover, a malicious miner can always pick up its
own transactions regardless of the gasPrice. This vulnerability
is caused by that the state of a contract depends on how minors
select transactions to assemble blocks. This vulnerability can
be mitigated by using a cryptographic commit-reveal scheme
to hide the information (e.g., gasPrice, value) offered by
transactions [78], [79], or by introducing a guard condition
to assure that an invocation of a contract either returns the
expected output or fails [63].
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25) Timestamp dependence (25): This vulnerability wasfirst reported in [63]. It occurs when a contract uses the
block.timestamp as a part of the triggering condition for
executing a critical operation (e.g., money transfer) or as the
source of randomness, which however can be manipulated by a
malicious miner. The vulnerability is caused by that Ethereum
only prescribes that a timestamp must be greater than the
timestamp of its parent block and be within future 900 seconds
of the current clock. If a contract uses a timestamp-based
condition (e.g., block.timestamp %25 == 0) to determine
whether or not to transfer money, a malicious miner can
slightly shift the timestamp to satisfy the condition to benefit
the attacker. This vulnerability can be prevented by not using
block.timestamp in any decision-making conditions.
26) Generating randomness (26): This vulnerability wasfirst reported in [80]. Many gambling and lottery contracts
select winners randomly, for which a common practice is
to generate a pseudorandom number based on some ini-
tial private seed (e.g., block.number, block.timestamp,
block.difficulty or blockhash). However, these seeds are
fully controlled by miners, meaning that a malicious miner can
manipulate these variables to make itself the winner [81], [82].
This vulnerability is caused by manipulable entropy sources.
There are several proposals for addressing this problem, and
each proposal has its own pros and cons. For example, the
Oracle RNG proposal [83] uses existing external services to
generate random numbers off-chain and then send back to the
requesting contract, meaning that there is a single-point-of-
failure in the Oracle RNG; the RANDAO proposal [84] uses a
collaborative cryptographic commit-reveal scheme to generate
a random number by multiple participants altogether, meaning
that it achieves a limited throughput.
B. Vulnerabilities at the data layer
1) Indistinguishable chains (27): This vulnerability wasfirst observed from the cross-chain replay attack when
Ethereum was divided into two chains, namely ETH and ETC
[85]. Recall that Ethereum uses ECDSA to sign transactions.
Prior to the hard fork for EIP-155 [86], each transaction con-
sisted of six fields (i.e., nonce, recipient, value, input, gasPrice
and gasLimit). However, the digital signatures were not chain-
specific because no chain-specific information was even known
back then. As a consequence, a transaction created for one
chain can be reused for another chain. This vulnerability has
been eliminated by incorporating and signing a chainID.
2) Empty account in the state trie (28): This vulnerabilitywas first observed from a DoS attack reported in [76], [77]. An
empty account is an account that has zero nonce, zero balance,
no code associated to it, and no storage associated to it. An
empty account is functionally equivalent to a non-existing
account, except that an empty account needs to be bookkept in
the Ethereum state trie and thus increases the synchronization
and transaction processing time. This means that an attacker
can incur a large number of empty accounts to substantially
increase the the synchronization and transaction processing
time, effectively causing a DoS attack [76], [77]. An empty
account can be incurred by an attacker using the SUICIDE
opcode to transfer zero Ethers to a non-existing account. This
vulnerability was caused by the lack of control over that an
empty account should not be included in the state trie. This
vulnerability has been eliminated by the hard fork for EIP-161
[87], which removes those empty accounts from the state trie
and prevents any empty account from being stored in the state
trie.
C. Vulnerabilities at the consensus layer
1) Outsourceable puzzle (29): This vulnerability was re-ported in [32]. Recall that Ethereum adopts the PoW puzzle
called Ethash, which was meant to be ASIC-resistant and be
able to limit the use of parallel computing (owing to that the
vast majority of a miner’s effort will be reading a dataset
via the limited memory bandwidth). However, a crafty miner
can still divide the task of searching for a puzzle solution
into multiple smaller tasks and then outsource them. This
vulnerability is caused by that Ethash only makes the puzzle
solution partially sequential in preimage search, rather than
relying on an inherently sequential PoW. Several puzzles are
proposed to cope with this problem [88], [89], which however
have not been adopted by the Ethereum community.
2) 51% hashrate (30): This vulnerability is inherent toPoW-based blockchains, where an attacker controlling a major-
ity of the mining power can take over the blockchain [90], [91].
Such an attacker can reverse transactions by formulating blocks
and performing double-spending at will. This vulnerability is
inevitable to PoW-based consensus protocols.
3) Fixed consensus termination (31): This vulnerabilitywas first discussed in [92]. It refers to the fact that Ethereum’s
consensus protocol achieves a probabilistic agreement with a
deterministic termination, meaning that a block is considered
persistent in the main chain with a high probability if it is
followed by a fixed number of 푚 blocks. In other words, the
consensus for block 푖 will terminate when the chain depth
reaches 푖+푚 and all of the transactions contained in block 푖 are
committed (i.e., a merchant can take an external action, such
as shipping goods). However, the probability of agreement
can be affected by various factors [92]. For example, in the
presence of communication delay, applications should wait for
more blocks to be confirmed so as to achieve a higher security
against double-spending. This vulnerability is caused by that
no deterministic protocol can simultaneously guarantee agree-
ment, termination, and validity in an asynchronous network
[93].
4) DoS with block stuffing (32): This vulnerability wasfirst observed from the Fomo3D contract [94]. The vulnera-
bility is that during a period of time, only the attacker’s trans-
actions are included in the newly-mined blocks and the other
transactions are abandoned by the miners. This can happen
when the attacker offers a higher gasPrice to incentivize the
miners to select the attacker’s transactions. This vulnerability
is caused by the greedy mining incentive mechanism. At
the moment of writing, there is no solution to prevent this
vulnerability.
5) Rewards for uncle blocks (33): This vulnerability wasindependently reported in [95], [33], [96]. The vulnerability
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refers to that the uncle-rewarding mechanism reviewed above
can lower the security of Ethereum when compared with
Bitcoin. In particular, the uncle-rewarding mechanism reduces
the risk for selfish miners that selectively release blocks to
maximize their own profit because stale blocks may become
uncle blocks and then receive rewards; this essentially incen-
tivize selfish mining and double-spending. At the moment of
writing, it is not clear how to eliminate this vulnerability.
D. Vulnerabilities at the network layer
1) Unlimited nodes creation (34): This vulnerability wasreported for the Geth client prior to its version 1.8 [35]. In
the Ethereum network, each node is identified by a unique
ID, which is a 64-byte ECDSA public key. An attacker could
create an unlimited number of nodes on a single machine (i.e.,
with the same IP address) and use these nodes to monopolize
the incoming and outgoing connections of some victim nodes,
effectively isolating the victims from the other peers in the
network. This vulnerability is caused by the weak restriction
on the node generation process. This vulnerability can be
eliminated by using a combination of IP address and public
key as node ID. This countermeasure has not been adopted by
the Geth developers who argue that it has a negative impact
on the usability of the client.
2) Uncapped incoming connections (35): This vulnerabil-ity was in the Geth client prior to its version 1.8 [35]. Each
node can have a total number of maxpeers (with a default
value 25) connections at any point in time, and can initiate
up to ⌊(1+maxpeers)∕2⌋ outgoing TCP connections with the
other nodes. However, there was no upper limit on the number
of incoming TCP connections initiated by the other nodes.
This gives the attacker an opportunity to eclipse a victim
by establishing an maxpeers many of incoming connections
to a victim node, which has no outgoing connections. This
vulnerability has been eliminated in Geth v1.8 by enforcing
an upper limit on the number of incoming TCP connections
to a node, with a default value ⌊maxpeers∕3⌋ = 8.
3) Public peer selection (36): This vulnerability was de-tected in Geth client prior to its version 1.8 [35]. Recall that
the Ethereum P2P network uses a modified Kademlia DHT
[97] for node discovery and that each node maintains a routing
table of 256 buckets for storing information about the other
nodes. The buckets are arranged based on the XOR distance
between a node’s ID and its neighboring node’s ID [98]. When
a node, say 퐴, needs to locate a target node, 퐴 queries the
16 nodes in its bucket that are relatively close to the target
node and asks each of these 16 nodes, say 퐵, to return the 16
IDs of 퐵’s neighbors that are closer to the target node. The
process iterates until the target node is identified. However,
the mapping from node IDs to buckets in the routing table is
public, meaning that the attacker can freely craft node IDs that
can land in a victim node’s buckets and insert malicious node
IDs into the victim node’s routing table [35]. This vulnerability
can be limited by making the “node IDs to buckets” mapping
private. This countermeasure has not been adopted by the Geth
developers who argue that it has a negative impact on the
usability of the client.
4) Sole block synchronization (37): This vulnerability wasfirst reported in [99]. It allows an attacker to partition the
Ethereum P2P network without monopolizing the connections
of a victim client. Recall that each block header contains
a difficulty field, which records the mining difficulty of the
block. The total difficulty of the blockchain, denoted by
totalDifficulty, is the sum of the difficulty of the blocks up to
the present one. When a client, say 퐴, receives from, say client
퐵, a block of which the difference totalDifficulty − difficulty
is greater than the totalDifficulty at the blockchain stored on
client 퐴 (meaning that client 퐴 missed a number of blocks),
퐴 should start a block synchronization with 퐵. Ethereum only
allows a client to synchronize with one other client at a time
(for network load considerations). This means that if client
퐵 is malicious and deliberately delays the synchronization in
response to 퐴’s request, the blockchain at client 퐴 is stalled
and 퐴 rejects every subsequent block, which may facilitate
double-spending and DoS attacks. This vulnerability can be
mitigated by synchronizing 퐴 with multiple nodes, which
however increases the network load.
5) RPC API exposure (38): This vulnerability was firstobserved from the attack against the Geth and Parity clients
[100]. The JSON-RPC of Ethereum clients provide various
APIs for EOAs to communicate with the Ethereum network.
For security purposes, the interface should only open locally
and not be accessible from the internet. However, the standard
port 8545 assigned to JSON-RPC can be accessed remotely in
the Geth and Parity clients by default, which makes it possible
for an attacker to call these remote clients via a JSON request
[101]. Once having access to the remote client, the attacker can
obtain sensitive data and perform certain unauthorized actions
on the remote client. The vulnerability is caused by insecure
API design and improper configuration. The vulnerability can
be prevented by configuring the listening port (rather than
using the default one) and adding access control to filter
remote RPC calls.
E. Vulnerabilities in the Ethereum environment
We propose considering vulnerabilities in the environment
with which Ethereum interacts because they also pose as
threats to Ethereum.
1) Weak password (39): This vulnerability was first ob-served from an attack against the DApp called Enigma [102].
The vulnerability refers to not only low-entropy passwords
but also password reuse and insecure password storage. When
the password of a DApp administrator is compromised, the
attacker can manipulate the DApp’s webpage at will to attack
others.
2) Cross-Site Scripting (XSS; 40): This vulnerability wasfirst observed from the attack against a cryptocurrency ex-
change, EtherDelta [103]. XSS is a browser-side vulnerability
which allows an attacker to inject malicious JavaScript code
into a HTTP webpage. To initiate a transaction via web-based
DApp, an EOA may need to fetch its private key from a
local file to the browser. An attacker can steal the private key
by uploading a malicious JavaScript to the webserver, while
claiming (for example) that the attacker is publishing informa-
tion about exchanging some tokens. The webserver pushes the
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attacker’s token-exchange content to a victim’s browser, which
executes the malicious JavaScript code, causing the private
key to be exposed to the attacker. This vulnerability can be
prevented by letting a user sign transactions offline and then
initiate transaction online, meaning that the private key is never
loaded into the browser and cannot be compromised by the
attack mentioned above.
3) Unvalidated URL redirection (41): This vulnerabilitywas first observed from an attack against the Ethereum wal-
let called MyEtherWallet [10]. Web applications frequently
redirect users to other webpages. If the target URL is not
authenticated, an attacker can replace the target URL with
a phishing or malicious website, which renders the users
vulnerable to attacks.
4) Broken access control (42): This vulnerability was firstobserved from an attack against the decentralized application
called CoinDash [104]. The access control failure at the server
side causes an unauthorized access to the web application,
which may result in the manipulation of the web page. Many
DApps start with an Initial Coin Offering (ICO). A common
practice is that participants obtain tokens by depositing Ether
to a certain contract account, whose address is published on the
website of the DApp. If an attacker breaks into the webserver
and replaces the original contract address with its own, then
the coin buyers will pay the attacker.
5) Unreliable Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) messages
(43): This vulnerability was first observed from an attackagainst MyEtherWallet [10]. Each BGP router maintains a
routing table with routing paths between ASes. BGP peers
broadcast IP prefixes they own and dynamically update their
routing tables according to the IP prefixes they received from
their neighbors. However, BGP has no mechanism for vali-
dating messages communicated between ASes, and therefore
simply treats them as trusted [105]. An attacker can announce
ownership of any prefix to its neighbor routers to redirect
traffic towards the malicious ASes under its control. Then, the
attacker can pretend to be a DNS server and redirect victims to
malicious websites at IP addresses under the attacker’s control.
6) Sensitive Domain Name System (DNS) servers (44):This vulnerability was also observed from the attack against
EtherDelta [106]. A wide range of vulnerabilities that can be
exploited to incorrectly resolve DNS queries and redirect users
to malicious websites, which can be achieved by hijacking
DNS through cache poisoning, stale records, and compromis-
ing the resolver configuration file. [107].
F. Further analysis of vulnerability causes
Now we present a taxonomy of the root causes of the
vulnerabilities reviewed above. As highlighted in Figure 5,
the vulnerabilities are caused by incompetence or flaws in
smart contract programming, solidity language and toolchain,
Ethereum design and implementation, and human, usability,
and networking factors.
1) Smart contract programming: These causes can be
further divided into four sub-causes: external dependence,
meaning a contract’s execution relies on the behavior of an
external contract; improper validation, meaning a failure in
checking a condition allows the passing of an invalid input;
inadequate authentication or authorization, causing failures
in checking a caller’s identity or privilege when the caller
attempts to access a protected data item or functionality;
and uncontrolled gas consumption, meaning a failure in gas
allocation permits a DoS attack. These causes led to 14
types of vulnerabilities. Among these 14, only 4 (i.e., Integer
overflow and underflow (6), erroneous visibility (9), secrecy
failure (12), DoS with unbounded operations (14)) exist intraditional software, meaning that the other 10 are unique to
Ethereum smart contract programming. This leads to:
Insight 1: Ethereum smart contracts introduce new kinds
of vulnerabilities.
Insight 1 is interesting because it says that a new pro-
gramming paradigm demands adequate training for program-
mers’ secure coding practice. Indeed, among the 26 types of
application-layer vulnerabilities, 20 can be prevented by using
best practices, highlighting the importance of engineering best
practices.
2) Solidity language and tool chain: These causes can be
further divided into five sub-causes, among which four sub-
causes are related to the improper design of the Solidity
language (i.e., inconsistent exception handling between direct
call and low-level calls; undefined behavior of uninitialized
storage pointers; improper syntax of constructor function; and
weak type system with flexible typing rules) and the other sub-
cause is buggy compiler (i.e., insufficient tool chain support).
These five causes contributed 5 types of vulnerabilities. This
leads to the following insight, which is clearly interesting and
important.
Insight 2: It is important to design more secure program-
ming languages and have more secure supporting tools for
programmers to write secure smart contracts.
3) Ethereum design and implementation: These causes can
be further divided into 14 sub-causes, which are related
to, among other things, EVM, blockchain, PoW consensus,
incentive mechanism, and P2P protocol. These causes cut
across the application layer, the data layer, the consensus layer,
and the network layer. The root causes related to EVM include:
(i) missing input check, meaning no check on the validity of a
transaction’s data; (ii) missing orphan proof, meaning no check
on a nonexistent recipient address; (iii) improper execution
model, meaning the behavior of EVM is not properly specified;
and (iv) improper gas costs, meaning the gas costs of EVM
opcodes are not properly specified.
The root causes related to blockchain include: (i) flexible
block creation, meaning there are no restrictions on miners
when they creating blocks, allowing them to create blocks
to favor themselves; (ii) insufficient transaction information,
meaning that a transaction can be accepted by multiple
Ethereum blockchains (e.g, ETH, ETC, Ropsten), rather than
a specific blockchain, owing to the lack of information spec-
ifying a unique blockchain; and (iii) uncontrolled state trie,
meaning that there are no restrictions on the accounts that can
be stored in the state trie.
The root causes related to the PoW consensus protocol
include: (i) partially sequential PoW, meaning that Ethereum’s
PoW puzzle can still be outsourced to different miners; (ii)
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inherent defect of PoW, meaning that a miner with 51%
hashrate can extend the main chain at will; and (iii) termi-
nation first, meaning that the Ethereum consensus protocol
prefers termination to agreement.
The root causes related to incentive mechanism include: (i)
greedy incentive, meaning that a miner always selects trans-
actions with higher 푔푎푠푃 푟푖푐푒; and (ii) incompatible incentive,
meaning that a miner can get a higher payoff by deviating
from the consensus protocol.
The root causes related to the P2P protocol include: (i)
improper RLPx protocol, meaning that the node discovery
and routing algorithms are not properly designed; and (ii)
improper Ethereum wire protocol, meaning that the blockchain
synchronization algorithm is not properly designed.
The root causes mentioned above contributed 18 vulner-
abilities, cutting across the application layer, the data layer,
the consensus layer, and the network layer; 9 out of these
18 vulnerabilities are still largely open (i.e., having yet to be
eliminated). In summary, we draw:
Insight 3: The vulnerabilities caused by the design and
implementation of the Ethereum blockchain are harder to cope
with than the other vulnerabilities.
Insight 3 is interesting because it highlights the difficulty
in designing and implementing a secure blockchain platform,
despite (as we will see later) that the vulnerabilities in
blockchain may not cause as big losses as the vulnerabilities
at the application layer.
4) Human, usability and networking factors: These causes
can be further divided into four sub-causes: improper con-
figuration, meaning that an Ethereum client is installed with
incorrect permissions; insufficient authentication, meaning the
use of weak or exposed passwords; faulty web development,
meaning that a DApp’s web interface is vulnerable; and
exposed Internet service, meaning attacks coming from the
Internet are not blocked. These causes led to seven vulnera-
bilities. In summary, we draw the following interesting insight.
Insight 4: Vulnerabilities in the Ethereum environment are
largely caused by human, usability, and networking factors,
which however consist of a smaller fraction of the vulnerabil-
ities when compared with the vulnerabilities that are inherent
to the Ethereum blockchain and smart contracts.
5) Cross-cutting analysis: We observe that there are 13
vulnerabilities that are largely open. In order to draw insights
into the approaches that may be able to eliminate them, we
look deeper into their root causes (than what were mentioned
above). First, we consider the vulnerabilities that are inherent
to the Ethereum blockchain design, including: under-priced
opcodes (23), which are inherent to the EVM gas costmechanism; outsourceable puzzle (29), 51% hashrate (30),and fixed consensus termination (31), which are inherent tothe PoW consensus mechanism; and DoS with block stuffing
(32) and rewards for uncle blocks (33), which are inherentto the Ethereum incentive mechanism. In order to eliminate or
mitigate these vulnerabilities, alternate gas cost mechanisms,
consensus mechanisms, and incentive mechanisms may have
to be used.
Second, we consider the vulnerabilities that are inherent to
the implementation of Ethereum clients, including unlimited
nodes creation (34), public peer selection (36), and sole
block synchronization (37). In order to eliminate or mitigatethese vulnerabilities, alternate network protocols may have
to be used without sacrificing platform usability or network
performance.
Third, we consider the vulnerabilities that are inherent to
the insecure environment in which Ethereum runs, including
unreliable BGP messages (43) and sensitive DNS servers(44). In order to eliminate or mitigate these vulnerabilities,extra effort must be made to defend the environment regardless
how Ethereum is designed and implemented.
Fourth, we consider the vulnerabilities that are inherent to
the application-layer flexibility, including upgradable contract
(4) and type casts (18). In order to eliminate or mitigatethese vulnerabilities, alternate contract design pattern and type
system may have to be used.
Summarizing the preceding discussion, we draw:
Insight 5: There are many vulnerabilities that are yet to be
tackled in order to adequately defend Ethereum (or blockchain-
based DApp systems in general), cutting across of every
layer of the architecture, from the application layer, the data
layer, the consensus layer, the network layer, down to the
environment layer.
IV. ATTACKS
Corresponding to the presentation of vulnerabilities, we
group the 26 attacks we consider according to the locations of
the vulnerabilities they exploit. We describe each attack from
the following perspective: its history, cause, tactic, and direct
impact (i.e., the consequence when the attack succeeds). For
ease of reference, we denote the 26 attacks by 1,… ,26,respectively. Note that some of these 26 attacks may corre-
spond to the same type of attacks (i.e., sharing the same
name), but they exploit different vulnerabilities or vulnerability
combinations and/or cause different consequences. For exam-
ple, both 2 and 3 correspond to the parity multisignature
wallet attack; however, 2 exploits the delegatecall injectionvulnerability (2) and the erroneous visibility vulnerability(9) to cause the consequence of unauthorized code execu-
tion, while 3 exploits the frozen ether vulnerability (3)and the unprotected suicide vulnerability (10) to cause theconsequence of DoS.
A. Attacks at the application layer
1) The DAO attack (1): The contract DAO is a financialapplication running on top of Ethereum. In June 2016, it
was attacked to cause the loss of US$60M [8]. The financial
application is that investors (i.e., token holders) vote on
investment proposals for spending their money (i.e., “invest-
ment crowdsourcing”). Once a proposal is approved by a
majority, the amount of money approved by the supporting
investors is moved to the proposer’s account, and the amount
of money owned by the minority that opposes the proposal
is respectively “refunded” to each of them via some newly
created contract accounts. This mechanism was implemented
in the splitDAO() function in Figure 8, which shows how the
attack exploits the reentrancy vulnerability (1). Specifically,
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the attack proceeds as follows: When a minority investor who
opposes the proposal requests for a “refund”, the DAO contract
creates a new DAO contract account (Step 1-2) and transfers the
requesting investor’s money to the new DAO contract account
(Step 3-4). The requesting investor may receive a reward for
its past contribution or activity (Step 5-6). The vulnerability is
that the number of tokens “refunded” to the requesting investor
depends on the state variables balances[msg.sender] and
totalSupply, which are updated in the end of the splitDAO()
function after the external call msg.sender.call.value(). This
allowed the attacker to recursively call the splitDAO() function
(Step 7) before the state variables are updated, causing a
malicious investor to draw more money than it deserves [39].
simplified function splitDAO(Proposal p, address _newCurator)
splitDAO(p, addr)
totalSupply -= balances[msg.sender];     
balances[msg.sender] = 0;
throw
p.newDAO.createTokenProxy(
fundsToBeMoved);
createNewDAO(addr);
N
msg.sender.call.value(reward)();
Y
NY
address(p.newDAO) == 0;
tokens
Contract 
newDAO
contract Attacker
{   …….
function () {
…….
splitDAO(p, addr);
}
}
Attacker
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
fundsToBeMoved = 
F(balances[msg.sender], totalSupply);
Fig. 8: The DAO attack exploiting the reentrancy vulnerability
(1).
2) Parity multisignature wallet attacks (2 and 3): InEthereum, a multisignature wallet is a smart contract which
requires multiple private keys to unlock a wallet in order to
safeguard Ether or tokens. As shown in Figure 9, a mul-
tisignature wallet supported by the Parity client consists of
two contracts: (i) a library contract called WalletLibrary,
which implements all of the core functions of a wallet; and
(ii) an actual Wallet contract, which holds a reference (i.e.,
_walletLibrary) that forwards all of the unmatched function
calls to the library contract via delegatecall (Line 7). The
Parity multisignature wallet was compromised twice in 2017,
which are briefly reviewed below.
The first attack, denoted by 2, exploited the delegatecall
injection vulnerability (2) and the erroneous visibility vulner-ability (9) to drain Ethers approximately worthy of US$31M.The attacker took over the ownership of contract Wallet
by sending a transaction to the contract with msg.data
containing initWallet() as the callee function (Line 13). Since
contract Wallet did not provide a function named initWal-
let(), the contract’s fallback function was triggered to delegate
the wallet initialization task to the function initWallet() in
WalletLibrary, which replaced the original multi-owner
of contract Wallet with the attacker’s address specified in
msg.data. This attack succeeds when the following four con-
ditions are satisfied simultaneously [42], [108]: (i) the function
initWallet() in the library was not specified as an internal one,
1 contract Wallet {
2 address _walletLibrary = new WalletLibrary();
3 address owner;
4 ...
5 function() payable {
6 if (msg.data.length > 0)
7 _walletLibrary.delegatecall(msg.data);
8 }
9 }
10
11 contract WalletLibrary {
12 ...
13 function initWallet(address[] _owners, uint _required, uint
↪ _daylimit){
14 initDaylimit(_daylimit);
15 initMultiowned(_owners, _required);
16 }
17 }
Fig. 9: Simplified vulnerable Parity multisignature wallet.
meaning that it can be externally called via delegatecall; (ii)
the WalletLibrary was actually a stateful contract, mean-
ing that it can change the state of Wallet; (iii) the function
initWallet() did not check whether the Wallet contract had
already been initialized (if so, no more initialization should be
done); (iv) the Wallet’s fallback function did not check the
function being called, but unconditionally forwarded any un-
matched calldata to WalletLibrary, allowing unintended
invocations.
The second attack, denoted by3, exploited the unprotected
suicide vulnerability (10) and the frozen Ether vulnerability(3), freezing approximately US$280M in the affected walletsforever [109]. In response to the first attack, the Parity de-
velopers added a modifier, only_uninitialized, to protect
function initWallet() such that a re-initialization of Wallet
via delegatecall will throw an exception and be rejected by
the modifier [110]. However, the shared WalletLibrary
itself was left uninitialized, which allowed an attacker to
bypass the only_uninitialized modifier and set himself
as the owner of the WalletLibrary [111]. Once taking
over the library, the attacker invoked the suicide method to
kill the library, causing all of the Wallet contracts relying
on the library unusable.
3) BECToken attack (4): BECToken, an ERC-20 con-tract, was attacked in April 2018 by an exploitation of the
integer overflow vulnerability (6), causing a massive amountof tokens stolen and a temporary shutdown of token trading
at exchange [112]. The vulnerability was in the function
batchTransfer() shown in Figure 10, and the function was
meant for users to transfer tokens to multiple recipients via
two arguments, one specifying the array of the recipients’
addresses and the other specifying the respective number of
tokens. The statement at Line 3 calculates the total number of
tokens the sender should pay for a particular transaction, but
may have the following integer overflow: By setting _value
to 2255 and _receivers to two accounts controlled by the
attacker, the attack overflows the 256-bit variable amount and
makes it zero [113]. As a consequence, the attack bypasses the
two checks at Lines 4-5 and causes sending the two receivers
extremely large numbers of tokens.
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1 function batchTransfer(address[] _receivers, uint256 _value) public
↪ whenNotPaused returns (bool) {
2 uint cnt = _receivers.length;
3 uint256 amount = uint256(cnt) * _value;4 require(cnt > 0 && cnt <= 20);
5 require(_value > 0 && balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
6 ... // transfer to specified recipients
7 }
Fig. 10: The vulnerable function in BECToken.
4) GovernMental attacks (5, 6, 7, and 8): Thecontract GovernMental was an array-based pyramid Ponzi
scheme, where the last participant wins a jackpot if no one
joins the scheme within 12 hours after the last participant
[114]. The contract has four vulnerabilities [12], which allowed
the following four attack tactics and explains why 5, 6,7, and 8 belong to the same type of attacks. The firstattack, denoted by 5, exploits the DoS with unbounded
operations vulnerability (14) that when the array bookkeepingthe number of participants becomes too large, the amount
of gas required for operating on the array will go beyond
the maximum gas that is permitted for assembling a block.
This effectively halts the transaction and the winner cannot
receive the 1,100 ETH jackpot. The second attack, denoted
by 6, exploits the unchecked call return value vulnerability(15) that the contract does not check the returned value whensending profits to the winner and the call-stack depth limit
vulnerability (22). As a consequence, the owner of contract
GovernMental to fail the payment as follows: (i) Calling
1024 contracts before calling the target callee contract of the
payee, which causes the callee contract to return FALSE to
the caller contract, meaning that the callee contract does not
receive the payment. (ii) The caller contract is supposed to
check this returned value and then proceeds correspondingly
but it does not. This causes the callee contract to lose money,
which now belongs to the owner of the caller contract. The
third attack, denoted by 7, exploits the transaction-ordering
dependence vulnerability (24) that a malicious miner canabandon some transactions related to GovernMental or
reorder transactions to make itself the last player (i.e., winner)
in each round. The fourth attack, denoted by 8, exploitsthe timestamp dependence vulnerability (25) that a maliciousminer can manipulate block.timestamp so that its own block
appears to be the last block to make itself win.
5) HYIP attack (9): The contract HYIP was anotherPonzi scheme, which pays existing investors from funds
contributed by new investors at the end of each day. This
mechanism is implemented by the function performPayouts()
highlighted in Figure 11, which contains the DoS with un-
expected revert vulnerability (5) (Line 7) [114]. The attackproceeds as follows: (i) The attacker, say Alice, writes an
exploitation contract, named Mallory, in which the attacker
invests and throws an exception in the fallback function (Line
14). (ii) When function performPayouts() is called to pay the
investors, the fallback function is invoked and throws an ex-
ception, causing a reversion of the money transfer (Line 7) and
thus DoS to contract HYIP. (iii) The attacker can blackmail
HYIP to pay a ransom for halting its attack, by undoing the
throw operation (Line 15) via function stopAttack (Line 18),
which can only be done by the contract owner, Alice.
1 contract HYIP {
2 Investor[] private investors;
3 ...
4 function performPayouts() {
5 for(uint idx = investors.length; idx−− > 0; ) {
6 uint payout=(investors[idx].amount*33)/1000;7 if(!investors[idx].addr.send(payout)) throw;
8 }
9 }}
10
11 contract Mallory {
12 bool private attack = true;
13 ...
14 function() payable {
15 if (attack) throw;
16 }
17 function stopAttack() {
18 if(msg.sender == owner) attack = false;
19 }
20 }
Fig. 11: Simplified HYIP contract and attack.
6) Fomo3D attacks (10 and 11): The contract Fomo3Dwas an extremely popular Ponzi game in year 2018, where
the last participant who buys a key before the timer runs
out won the jackpot. The price of keys gradually grows with
the number of buyers. When a key was sold, the countdown
extends for 30 seconds. In addition to the jackpot winner,
Fomo3D implemented an airdrop lottery to attract participants.
For each purchase over 0.1 ETH, the participant (i.e., buyer)
had a random chance to be picked up for a tiny profit from the
prize pool. These two incentive mechanisms can be attacked
as follows [115].
The first attack, denoted by 10, is against the airdropmechanism. Specifically, the attack exploited the generating
randomness vulnerability (26). As shown in Figure 12,function airdrop() generates a random seed by performing
a deterministic computation on the current block state (i.e.,
block.timestamp, block.difficulty, etc.) and the ad-
dress of msg.sender (Line 2-8). If the seed satisfies a
certain condition (Line 10), the current key buyer wins an
airdrop. However, since the block information is predictable,
an attacker can simply pre-compute the addresses of new
contracts and brute-forces for the winning seed (Line 2).
The second attack, denoted by 11, is against the winningmechanism [115]. Specifically, the attack exploited the DoS
with block stuffing vulnerability (32) and causes the attackerto win the prize of approximately US$3M [94]. The attack
proceeds as follows: When the timer of the game reached about
three minutes, the attacker bought a key and then sent multiple
transactions to his own accounts with high enough gasPrice.
Owing to the choice of miners, these transactions were first
assembled into blocks. Since the maximum amount of gas
consumption for a block is limited, any transactions related to
Fomo3D were not assembled into blocks. By congesting the
network until the game was over, the attacker succeeded in
becoming the last player.
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1 function airdrop() private view returns(bool) {
2 uint256 seed= uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(
3 (block.timestamp).add
4 (block.difficulty).add
5 ((uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(block.coinbase)))) / (
↪ now)).add
6 (block.gaslimit).add
7 ((uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender)))) / (
↪ now)).add
8 (block.number)
9 )));
10 if((seed−((seed/1000)*1000)) < airDropTracker_)11 return(true);
12 else
13 return(false);
14 }
15 }
Fig. 12: A snippet source code of Fomo3D.
7) ERC-20 signature replay attack (12): This attack,which was first reported in [116], exploits the insufficient sig-
nature information vulnerability (13). When a user transfersERC-20 tokens, the user must have enough Ether to pay the
transaction fee, which can be inconvenient when the user does
not own any Ether. In order to alleviate the problem, the proxy-
transfer method is introduced such that a user can authorize
a proxy to carry out a transaction and pay the proxy some
extra tokens as its service fee. As shown in Figure 13, when
Alice is to transfer 100 MTC tokens to Bob, she can send
a signed message off-chain to a proxy (Step 1) such that
the proxy launches a transaction to transfer 100 tokens to
Bob and receives 3 token from Alice for the service (Step
2). A signature is verified using function transferProxy(),
which uses the Solidity function ecrecover() (Line 5) to
identify Alice’s account address that issued the signature.
However, Alice’s off-chain message may not provide her token
contract address, which should be bound to her signature. As
a consequence, the signature can be accepted as valid with
respect to any token contract address (e.g., MTC, UGToken,
and GGoken), meaning that Bob can replay the signed message
to other kinds of token contracts, such as UGToken (Step 4),
to obtain extra money from Alice (Step 5) [57].
8) Rubixi attack (13): The Rubixi contract is aPonzi scheme which contains the erroneous constructor
name vulnerability (17). The contract was originally named
DynamicPyramid and was later renamed by the developer
to Rubixi. However, the contract’s constructor name was
not updated accordingly, allowing anyone that calls the public
function DynamicPyramid() to become the owner of the
contract and therefore steal the funds of the contract.
B. Attacks at the data layer
1) ETH and ETC cross-chain replay attack (14):Ethereum had a hard fork after the DAO attack, splitting
into ETH and ETC that share the same transaction history.
This means that a transaction that was validated by the ETH
network could also be accepted by the ETC network when
the recipient immediately rebroadcast the transaction on the
ETC network, and vice versa [117]. Since both ETC and ETH
networks did not implement any defense against this attack
contract MTC { 
function transferProxy(
_from, _to,  _value, _fee, _v, _r, _s）
}Alice
Proxy
Bob
transferProxy(Alice, Bob, 100, 3, v, r, s)
MTC Token
100
3
Sig(Alice, Bob,100, 3, nonce) = v, r, s
contract UGToken { 
function transferProxy(
_from, _to,  _value, _fee, _v, _r, _s）
}
transferProxy(Alice, Bob, 100, 3, v, r, s)
UGToken 103
1
3
5
4
2
1 function transferProxy(address _from, address _to, uint256 _value,
↪ uint256 _fee, uint8 _v,bytes32 _r, bytes32 _s) returns (bool){
2 if(balances[_from] < _fee + _value) throw;
3 uint256 nonce = nonces[_from];
4 bytes32 h = sha3(_from, _to, _value, _fee, nonce);
5 if(_from != ecrecover(h, _v, _r, _s)) throw;
6 if(balances[_to] + _value < balances[_to] || balances[msg.sender] +
↪ _fee < balances[msg.sender]) throw;
7 balances[_to] += _value;
8 Transfer(_from, _to, _value);
9 balances[msg.sender] += _fee;
10 Transfer(_from, msg.sender, _fee);
11 balances[_from] −= _value + _fee;
12 nonces[_from] = nonce + 1;
13 return true;
14 }
Fig. 13: Cross-contract replay attack via transferProxy().
that exploited the indistinguishable chains vulnerability (27),exchanges participating in both chains (e.g., Coinbase and
Yunbi) lost a large amount of money [85].
2) Under-priced DDoS attacks (15 and 16): These at-tacks, which were reported in [75], [76], [77], exploited both
application-layer and data-layer vulnerabilities.
Specifically, the first attack, denoted by 15, exploitedthe under-priced opcodes vulnerability (23) owing to theimproper gas cost of EVM’s EXTCODESIZE opcode. Prior
to the EIP 150 hard fork, the EXTCODESIZE opcode only
charged 20 gas for reading a contract’s bytecode from disk
and then deriving its length. As a consequence, the attacker
can repeatedly send transactions to invoke a deployed smart
contract with many EXTCODESIZE opcodes to cause a 2-3x
slower block creation rate [75].
The second attack, denoted by 16, exploited the under-
priced opcodes vulnerability (23) owing to the improper gascost of EVM’s SUICIDE opcode and the empty account in the
state trie vulnerability (28). The SUICIDE opcode (renamedto SELFDESTRUCT after EIP 6) is meant to remove a deployed
contract from the blockchain and send the remaining balance
of Ether to the account designated by the caller. When the
target account does not exist, a new account is created even
though no Ether may be transferred; this consumes merely
90 gas [76]. Since an existing empty account is stored in the
Ethereum state trie, the attacker created 19 million new empty
accounts via the SUICIDE opcode at a low gas consumption,
which wasted considerable disk space while increasing the
synchronization and transaction processing time.
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C. Attacks at the consensus layer
1) Ethereum Classic (ETC) 51% attack (17): In January2019, ETC suffered from a 51% attack that exploited the 51%
hashrate vulnerability (30), in which the attacker carriedout double-spending transactions against several exchanges,
causing an estimated loss of US$1.1M [118]. Since 2018,
ETC’s mining hashrate had dropped significantly due to the
declining in its price, which lowered the amount of comput-
ing resources that are required for launching a 51% attack.
Moreover, cloud mining services (e.g., NiceHash) make it even
easier to launch 51% attacks. The attack was disrupted when
exchanges increased the number of blocks that are required
for transaction confirmation and limited the participation of
malicious addresses in ETC trade.
2) Selfish-mining attack (18): The selfish-mining attack,which exploits the rewards for uncle blocks vulnerability
(33), means that miners may withhold their newly minedblocks and selectively publish some of their blocks to earn an
unfair share of reward. A selfish miner continuously monitors
the situation on a blockchain’s public branches, estimates its
advantages, and reveals its private blocks accordingly. When
the public branches are shorter than the selfish-miner’s private
branch, the honest miners will switch to latter, rendering their
previous mining effort useless and making the selfish-miners
receive a higher reward. Ritz et al. [96] conducted a Monte
Carlo simulation to emulate the block generation process in
Ethereum and quantified the impact of uncle rewards on
selfish-mining. Their simulation results showed that the uncle-
block reward mechanism not only lowered the threshold of
computational power at which selfish-mining becomes prof-
itable, but also weakened the overall resilience against other
attackers such as double-spending. Niu et al. [33] developed a
mathematical analysis on a selfish-mining strategy through a
2-dimensional Markov process model, showing that Ethereum
is more vulnerable to selfish-mining than Bitcoin.
3) Balance attack (19): This attack exploits the fixed
consensus termination vulnerability (31) owing to the prob-abilistic PoW consensus in the presence of communication
delays (or asynchronous networks) and the unreliable BGP
messages vulnerability (43). This attack was first reportedin [119] via a theoretic analysis and testnet demonstration.
The attack is to transiently partition the network into multiple
subgroups of similar mining power so as to launch the double-
spending attack at a subgroup of lower mining power. This
allows the attacker to initiate transactions with merchants in
one subgroup, while mining blocks in another subgroup to
make its subtree outweighs the subtree mined in the victim
group. After transactions in the victim subgroup get confirmed,
the attacker reconnects the network. Since the mining power is
roughly equally distributed among the subgroups, the subtree
broadcast by the attacker has a good chance to be selected as
the main chain, meaning that the attacker can double-spend
in the victim subgroup. This attack was later deemed only
theoretically possible because partitioning a public Ethereum
network (e.g., using BGP-hijacking) may not be feasible in
practice [120].
D. Attacks at the network layer
1) Account hijacking attack (20): This attack exploits the
RPC API exposure vulnerability (38). In order to sign trans-actions, an EOA must first decrypt its private key that is stored
on the local host and encrypted with a passphrase. This can be
achieved by using the unlockAccount() API of an Ethereum
client, which uses the passphrase to obtain the private key
and loads it into the memory for 300 seconds (by default).
The private key in memory can be accessed by any Ethereum
API without authentication. This can be exploited as follows.
Ethereum clients (e.g., Geth, Parity) typically use the default
ports 8545 (HTTP) and 8546 (WebSocket) for the JSON-RPC
interface. However, these client software neither configure
those ports as local-only by default, nor adopt precautions
(e.g., disabling remote calls). This allows an attacker to scan
open Ethereum nodes and invoke eth_sendTransaction()
API to transfer victims’ money to the attacker’s account.
Once a victim types its passphrase to unlock its account, the
eth_sendTransaction() API will be successfully executed.
By the time the attack was observed in March 2018 [100],
attackers had already stolen around US$20M from exposed
Ethereum clients.
2) Eclipse attacks (21 and 22): This attack allows anattacker, who can hijack the connections of some victim nodes
in the P2P network, to create a virtual partition to isolate those
victim nodes from the rest of the network. Victim nodes’ con-
nections can be hijacked at least by connection monopolization
and poisoning victims’ routing tables [35]. The connection
monopolization attack, denoted by 21, exploits the unlimited
nodes creation vulnerability (34) and the uncapped incoming
connections vulnerability (35). When a client reboots, it hasno incoming or outgoing connections. An attacker can create
plenty of node IDs in advance and initiate enough incoming
connections to the victim node immediately after its reboot. A
node is eclipsed when its connection slots (25 by default) are
occupied by incoming connections from the attacker. Despite
the response to the aforementioned connection monopolization
attack in imposing an upper limit on the number of incoming
TCP connections, the following attack, denoted by 22, stillcan succeed. Specifically, an attacker still can exploit the
public peer selection vulnerability (36) to poison the victimnodes’ routing tables when these tables are reboot and reset
(e.g., the attacker could craft fake nodes and insert them into
those routing tables to make the victim nodes’ outgoing TCP
connections point to the fake nodes controlled by the attacker).
The attacker can further occupy the victim nodes’ remaining
connection slots by initiating connections to the victim nodes.
E. Attacks against the environment
1) EtherDelta attack (23): EtherDelta is a popular ex-change for users to trade ERC-20 tokens. It suffered from a
code injection or EtherDelta attack that exploited the Cross-
Site Scripting vulnerability (40) in September 2017, causinga loss in cryptocurrency worth of thousands of dollars [103].
The attacker constructed a new token contract, which contains
a piece of malicious JavaScript code in the token’s name.
Recall that EtherDelta extracts a newly created token’s name
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from the token contract’s code and displays the name on the
exchange’s website. Recall also that when performing a token-
trade transaction, a user needs to load its private key and
account address to the web browser for signing the transaction.
As a consequence, when the name of a newly created token
was displayed on the user’s browser, the malicious JavaScript
code was executed to steal the user’s private key from the
browser, causing the loss of money protected by the private
key.
2) CoinDash attack (24): CoinDash, a portfolio manage-ment platform, was compromised due to an exploitation of the
broken access control vulnerability (42) during the course ofits ICO in Jul 2017, causing the loss of US$7M worth of Ether
within a few minutes. The attack proceeds by getting into the
infected web application that hosts CoinDash’s webpage, and
replacing the ICO contract address with one that is controlled
by the attacker [104].
3) Enigma attack (25): Enigma, a decentralized invest-ment platform, was attacked prior to its ICO in August 2017
[102], owing to the exploitation of the weak password vulner-
ability (39). Through social engineering means, the attackersuccessfully stole an Enigma founder’s password, which was
disclosed in an unrelated attack and reused in Enigma. As a
consequence, the attacker took control of the company’s Slack
channel, email lists, and Google account hosting the ICO’s
presale. The attacker replaced the official ICO contract address
with the attacker’s own address and sent messages to solicit
buyers in fake presales.
4) MyEtherWallet attack (26): MyEtherWallet, a popularweb-based wallet, was attack in April 2018 owing to the ex-
ploitation of the unreliable BGP messages vulnerability (43),the sensitive DNS vulnerability (44), and the unvalidated
URL redirection vulnerability (41). The attack exploits a jointBGP and DNS hijacking to mislead users to a fake version
of the website and compromised the victims’ private keys
[10]. The hacker then emptied the victims’ wallets and stole
approximately US$17M. The attacker first exploited a routing
weakness in BGP and hijacked the traffic to Amazon’s Route
53 servers, which provided DNS service to MyEtherWallet.
When users visit their MyEtherWallet, their requests were
rerouted to the fake DNS servers controlled by the attacker,
which returned IP addresses to direct users to a phishing
website. The unsuspecting users, who neglected the TLS/SSL
certificate warning sign, proceeded to login to the phishing
site, causing their passphrases and private keys exposed.
F. Further analysis of attack consequences
Now we present a taxonomy of the attack consequences
mentioned above: unauthorized code execution, DoS, unfair
income, double-spending, private key leakage, and webpage
manipulation, which are elaborated below. Figure 14 high-
lights the relationship between these attack consequences, at-
tacks, and vulnerabilities, where the vulnerabilities and attacks
are ordered in such a way that allows us to clearly present the
relationships between them (i.e., neither the vulnerabilities nor
the attacks are ordered as they are discussed in the text). For
ease of reference, we use “푖(푗 ,⋯)” to denote that attack푖 exploits vulnerabilities 푗 and possibly others.
1) Unauthorized code execution: This consequence occurs
in one of the following four scenarios. (i) The attacker uses
the DAO attack (1) to exploit the reentrancy vulnerability(1), namely 1(1). (ii) The attacker uses the first Paritymultisignature wallet attack (2) to exploit the delegatecall
injection vulnerability (2) and the erroneous visibility vul-nerability (9), namely 2(2,9). (iii) The attacker usesthe BECToken attack (4) to exploit the Integer overflow(6), namely 4(6). (iv) The attacker wages the Rubixiattack (13) to exploit the erroneous constructor name (17),namely 13(17). The biggest financial loss caused by a singleunauthorized code execution is US$60M, owing to the DAO
attack (1) [8].
2) DoS: This consequence can be further divided into
two sub-consequences: DoS against smart contracts and DoS
against Ethereum network. The former sub-consequence oc-
curs in one of the following four scenarios: (i) The attacker
wages the second Parity multisignature wallet attack (3) toexploit the frozen Ether vulnerability (3) and the unprotected
suicide vulnerability (10), namely 3(3,10). (ii) The at-tacker uses the HYIP attack (9) to exploit the DoS with
unexpected revert vulnerability (5), namely 9(5). (iii) Theattacker uses the GovernMental attack (5) to exploit the
DoS with unbounded operations vulnerability (14), namely5(14). (iv) The attacker uses the Fomo3D attack (11)to exploit the DoS with block stuffing vulnerability (32),namely 11(32). The latter sub-consequence occurs in oneof the following scenarios: (i) The attacker uses the under-
priced DDoS attack (15) to exploit the under-priced opcodesvulnerability (23), namely15(23). (ii) The attacker uses theunder-priced DDoS attack (16) to exploit the under-priced
opcodes vulnerability (23) and the empty account in the state
trie vulnerability (28), namely 16(23,28). The biggestfinancial loss caused by a single DoS attack is US$280M,
owing to the second attack against the Parity wallet (3) [109].
3) Unfair income: This consequence occurs in one of the
following scenarios: (i) A malicious contract owner uses the
GovernMental attack (6) to exploit the unchecked call return
value vulnerability (15) and the call-stack depth limit (22)vulnerability to hold the money that should be transferred to a
callee contract or EOA, namely 6(15,22). (ii) A maliciousminer wages the GovernMental attack (7) to exploit the
transaction-ordering dependence vulnerability (24), namely7(24). (iii) A malicious miner wages the GovernMentalattack (8) to exploit the timestamp dependence vulnerability(25), namely 8(25). (iv) The attacker wages the Fomo3Dattack (10) to exploit the generating randomness vulnera-bility (26) to make itself the winner, namely 10(26). (v)An attacker uses the ERC-20 signature replay attack (12)to exploit the insufficient signature information vulnerability
(13), namely 12(13). (vi) The attacker uses the ETH andETC cross-chain replay attack (14) to exploit the indistin-
guishable chains vulnerability (27) to repeatedly withdrawmoney, namely 14(27). (vii) A malicious miner wages theselfish mining attack (18) to exploit the rewards for uncle
blocks vulnerability (33) to get a higher mining reward,namely 18(33). The biggest financial loss caused by a singleunfair income attack is US$0.5M, owing to an ETH and ETC
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Fig. 14: The relation between vulnerabilities, attacks and attack consequences.
cross-chain replay attack (14) [85].
4) Double-spending: This consequence occurs in one of the
following four scenarios: (i) The attacker uses the 51% attack
(17) to exploit the 51% hashrate vulnerability (30), namely17(30). (ii) The attacker uses the eclipse attack (21) toexploit the unlimited nodes creation vulnerability (34) and the
uncapped incoming connections vulnerability (35), namely21(34,35). (iii) The attacker uses the eclipse attack (22)to exploit the public peer selection vulnerability (36), namely22(36). (iv) The attacker uses the balance attack (19)to exploit the fixed consensus termination vulnerability (31)and the unreliable BGP messages vulnerability (43), namely19(31,43). The biggest financial loss caused by a singledouble-spending attack is about US$1.1M, owing to the ETC
51% attack (17) [118].
5) Private key leakage: This consequence occurs in one
of the following three scenarios. (i) The attacker uses the
MyEtherWallet attack (26) to exploit the unvalidated URL
redirection vulnerability (41), the unreliable BGP mes-
sages vulnerability (43), and the sensitive DNS vulnerability(44) to direct the victim to a malicious website, namely26(41,43,44). (ii) A user’s private key is stolen by anattacker that uses the account hijacking attack (20) to exploitthe RPC API exposure vulnerability (38) to hijack the victim’s
account from a remote Ethereum client, namely 20(38). (iii)The attacker uses the EtherDelta attack (23) to exploit the
Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability (40) to hijack the victim’sbrowser session, namely 23(40). The biggest financial losscaused by a private key leakage is US$20M, owing to an
account hijacking attack (20) [100].
6) Webpage manipulation: This consequence occurs in one
of the following two scenarios. (i) A DApp’s website interface
is compromised by an attacker that wages the CoinDash attack
(24) to exploit the broken access control vulnerability (42),namely 24(42). (ii) The attacker uses the Enigma attack(25) to exploit the weak password vulnerability (39), namely25(39). These vulnerabilities reside in, or are inherited from,the Ethereum environment. The biggest financial loss caused
by a webpage manipulation is US$7M, owing to an attack
against CoinDash (24) [104].
7) Summary and insights: Table II summarizes the afore-
mentioned attacks, the layers at which the vulnerabilities
they exploit reside, attack consequences, and financial losses
incurred by those attacks. This allows us to draw the following
insights:
Insight 6: The biggest financial loss in the Ethereum system
is $280M, which is caused by a DoS attack against the Parity
wallet that disabled a library that is used by many contracts.
Insight 6 is interesting at least from two points of view. First,
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TABLE II: Overview of attacks and financial losses.
Attack
targets
Vulnerability
location Real-world attacks Attack consequences
Financial
losses
DApp
Application
The DAO (1) Unauthorized code exec. US$60M
Parity (i) (2) Unauthorized code exec. US$31M
Parity (ii) (3) DoS US$280M
Environment
CoinDash (24) Webpage manipulation US$7M
Enigma (25) Webpage manipulation US$0.5M
MyEtherWallet (26) Private key leakage US$17M
Consensus
Fomo3D (ii) (11) DoS US$3M
Ethereum
ETC 51% (17) Double spending US$1.1M
Data ETH & ETC replay (14) Unfair income US$0.5M
Network Account hijacking (20) Private key leakage US$20M
DoS often causes indirect economic losses incurred by the
unavailability of services. The DoS attack against Ethereum
manifests direct economic losses. Second, the DoS attack is
caused by code-reuse, which is a widely adopted practice in
the traditional paradigm of programming. However, in the
paradigm of DApps, code-reuse may impose a higher risk
than ever, highlighting the importance of security auditing for
popular contracts as well as the libraries they use.
Insight 7: DApps running on top of the Ethereum
blockchain are not fully decentralized when they use central-
ized web interfaces.
Insight 7 is interesting because it points out one sce-
nario that manifests that blockchain-based systems are not
necessarily decentralized, despite the popular view. Indeed,
vulnerabilities in those web interfaces can cause large financial
losses. This highlights the importance of decentralizing the
web interfaces to the blockchain-based systems.
Insight 8: Application-layer attacks have caused the largest
financial losses among the attacks against Ethereum.
Insight 8 is interesting because a vulnerability at a lower
layer would often cause a larger damage than a vulnerability
at a higher layer. This rule of thumb does not necessarily apply
to Ethereum or blockchain-based systems in general. This can
be (at least partly) attributed to the fact that DApps operate
directly on the digital assets, and highlights the importance of
assuring application-layer security.
V. DEFENSES
In this section, we describe the 47 defenses that have been
proposed for securing the Ethereum ecosystem, which are
denoted by 1,… ,47, respectively. Unlike vulnerabilitiesand attacks which naturally correspond to some layer of
the Ethereum architecture, defenses are by no means geared
towards the layers. Therefore, we propose categorizing them
into two classes: proactive defenses and reactive defenses.
A. Proactive defenses
We categorize existing proactive defense mechanisms into
the following five sub-classes based on the respective focuses
of these mechanisms: contract programming language, con-
tract development, contract analysis, contract and Ethereum
enhancement, and consensus protocols.
1) Language-based security: Programming language ap-
proaches to securing smart contracts can be divided into two
categories: high-level languages for developing more secure
smart contracts and intermediate-level languages for facilitat-
ing contract formal analysis.
a) High-level languages: Vyper [121] (1) removes anumber of functionalities provided by Solidity (e.g., recursive
calling, infinite loops, modifiers) and adds several new features
(e.g., bounds and overflow checking) to eliminate vulnerabili-
ties, such as the DoS with unbounded operations vulnerability
(14), the erroneous visibility vulnerability (9), and the
Integer overflow and underflow vulnerability (6). Bamboo[122] (2) uses polymorphism to mitigate the transaction-
ordering dependence vulnerability (24), while eliminating the
reentrancy vulnerability (1) and the DoS with unbounded
operations vulnerability (14). Obsidian [123] (3) modelssmart contracts as finite state machines and tracks contracts’
states to eliminate the reentrancy vulnerability (1). Flint[124] (4) uses an Asset type to assure the atomicity ofoperations and introduces restrictions on callers’ capabilities
to protect contract functions from unauthorized access, while
aiming to eliminate the reentrancy vulnerability (1), the
erroneous visibility vulnerability (9), the Integer overflow and
underflow vulnerability (6), and the timestamp dependencyvulnerability (25).
b) Intermediate-level languages: Simplicity [125] (5)is an intermediate representation between high-level languages
and low-level virtual machine. It provides formal semantics
using the proof-assistant Coq [126], thus allowing formally
analysis of contracts properties (e.g., safety and liveness).
Scilla [127] (6) distinguishes in-contract computation frominter-contract communication to disentangle contract-specific
effects from each other.
2) Contract development: Since smart contracts are a new
programming paradigm, these defenses can help developers in
avoiding or mitigating common vulnerabilities.
a) Principles and best practices: A number of Solidity
best practices were recommended in [11], such as check, up-
date, then interact (i.e., checking conditions first, then updating
state variables, and finally interacting with other contracts);
favor pull over push for external calls (i.e., letting a recipient
withdraw or “pull” the money set by the sender, rather than
letting the sender directly transfer or “push” the money to
the recipient). In order to make it easier for practitioners to
adopt those best practices, we systematize 19 best practices
(7) according to the vulnerabilities towards which they aregeared, while noting that 15 of these 19 best practices were
scattered in [11], [54], [44]. Our systematization leads to 4
general principles or 6 specific sub-principles in total.
Figure 15 highlights these (sub-)principles. Intuitively, a
programmer should be conscious of four kinds of controls:
call control, data control, resource control, and tool control.
(i) The call control principle says that a programmer should
secure the interactions between smarts contracts and the in-
teractions between EOAs and smart contracts. This principle
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Fig. 15: Best practices and principles for guiding contract development.
is further divided into two sub-principles: one coping with
the callee’s unexpected behaviors and the other coping with
the caller’s access control. (ii) The data control principle says
that a programmer should secure the data flow of a contract.
This principle is further divided into two sub-principles: one
dealing with the protection of sensitive data and the other
dealing with the prevention of malformed data from entering
a smart contract. (iii) The resource control principle says that
a programmer should mitigate the exhaustion of available gas
in Ethereum. (iv) The tool control principle says that a pro-
grammer should use updated tools (e.g., compiler, debugger)
to eliminate known vulnerabilities.
b) Software engineering mechanisms: In order to de-
fend against attacks that may exploit unknown vulnerabilities,
several blockchain-oriented software engineering mechanisms
were introduced [128] (8), such as: the rate limit mechanism,which restricts the number of consecutive actions incurred by
an EOA or restricts the amount of Ether sent by a contract
within a period of time; the balance limit mechanism, which
regulates the maximum amount of funds that can be held by a
contract; the speed bump mechanism, which postpones some
potentially-damaging operations.
3) Smart contract analysis: These defenses aim to enhance
security of smart contracts via the following approaches:
symbolic execution, abstract interpretation, formal verification,
fuzzing and model-based vulnerability detection.
a) Symbolic execution: It works on a program’ control-
flow graph (CFG) and traverses all of the feasible execution
paths on the graph to identify vulnerabilities [129]. This
approach achieves neither soundness (i.e., zero false-negatives)
nor completeness (i.e., zero false-positives), owing to the
omission of some execution paths and the exploration of
unreachable paths in real executions. Oyente [63] (9) candetect four types of vulnerabilities — the reentrancy vulner-
ability (1), the mishandled exceptions vulnerability (15),the transaction-ordering dependence vulnerability (24), andthe timestamp dependence vulnerability (25) — but incursa high false-positive rate [64]. Maian [55] (10) extendsOyente by considering multiple invocations of a contract,
rather than a single invocation. It can detect three types of
vulnerabilities: the frozen Ether vulnerability (3), the leaking
Ether to arbitrary address vulnerability (11), and the unpro-
tected suicide vulnerability (10). Mythril [130] (11) uses“concolic analysis”, which integrates symbolic and concrete
execution of a smart contract, to detect 8 types of vulner-
abilities, such as the manipulated balance vulnerability (7),the authentication through tx.origin vulnerability (8), and the
generating randomness vulnerability (26). The teEther tool[43] (12) can detect vulnerabilities like the erroneous visi-
bility vulnerability (9) and the erroneous constructor namevulnerability (17). The sCompile tool [131] (13) reducesthe number of suspicious execution paths that are not related
to money-transfer. It can detect 4 types of vulnerabilities: the
reentrancy vulnerability (1), the frozen Ether vulnerability(3), the unprotected suicide vulnerability (10), and the Ether
lost to orphan address vulnerability (21). ECF [132] (14)focuses on detecting callback-related vulnerabilities, such as
the reentrancy vulnerability (1).
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Fig. 16: Workflow of vulnerability detector Securify.
b) Abstract interpretation: Abstract interpretation aims
to over-approximate the semantics of a program so as to
achieve soundness in program analysis [133]. Securify [134]
(15) defines a set of compliance and violation patterns tocharacterize how contract comply and violate security prop-
erties extracted from some known vulnerabilities, such as
the reentrancy vulnerability (1), the delegatecall injectionvulnerability (2), and the frozen Ether vulnerability (3).Figure 16 highlights how these patterns can be used to detect
vulnerabilities. Zeus [64] (16) defines a set of correctnessand fairness policies and then embeds them as assert state-
ments into the source code of contracts. It can detect six
types of vulnerabilities, such as the reentrancy vulnerability
(1) and the unchecked call return value vulnerability (15).FSolidM [135] (17) abstracts smart contracts as finite state
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machines and can detect the reentrancy vulnerability (1)and the transaction-ordering dependence vulnerability (24).MadMax [62] (18) disassembles EVM bytecode into anintermediate representation and then leverages both data-
flow analysis and context-sensitive flow analysis to detect
gas-related vulnerabilities, such as the DoS with unbounded
operations vulnerability (14). Vandal [136] (19) translatesEVM bytecode into logic relations and use them to detect a
number of vulnerabilities, such as the reentrancy vulnerability
(1), the authentication through tx.origin vulnerability (8),the unprotected suicide vulnerability (10), and the unchecked
call return value vulnerability (15).
In order to facilitate the aforementioned high-level contract
analysis, several reverse engineering tools have been developed
to convert EVM bytecode to source code or intermediate pre-
sentation. Porosity [137] (20) is a decompiler for producingSolidity source code from EVM bytecode. Erays [138] (21)lifts EVM bytecode to a high-level pseudocode by recovering
the control-flow structure and transforming EVM from a
stack-based machine to a register-based machine. EthIR [139]
(22) decompiles EVM bytecode to a high-level rule-basedrepresentation, which can then be fed into an automated static
analyzer to infer high-level properties of the EVM bytecode.
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Fig. 17: Theorem proving for verifying smart contracts.
c) Formal verification: Formal verification proves the
correctness of contract implementation with respect to a speci-
fication. This approach assures the completeness (i.e., no false
positives). Figure 17 illustrates how to use theorem-proving
to verify smart contracts at the EVM bytecode-level. Hirai
[140] (23) took the first step towards formalizing the EVMsemantics, which can be accommodated by interactive theorem
provers like Isabelle/HOL [141] to prove invariants and safety
properties of smart contracts. Amani et al. [142] (24) extendthe work in [140] by splitting a contract into some basic
blocks and then using a Hoare-style program logic to reason
about semantic properties of contracts from properties of its
parts. Hildenbrandt et al. [143] (25) present a completesemantics of the EVM, referred to as KEVM, using the 핂
framework [144] to achieve language-independent program
verification. Park et al. [145] (26) optimize the KEVMverifier by introducing EVM-specific abstractions and lemmas
to avoid non-tractable reasoning in the underlying theorem
prover. Grishchenko et al. [146] (27) define a complete small-step semantics of EVM bytecode and formalize most of the
semantics in the proof assistant F* [147]. Grishchenko et al.
[148], [149] (28) leverage the complete small-step semanticsof EVM bytecode to build EtherTrust, which is the first
sound and automated static analyzer to achieve formal security
related to the reachability properties of EVM bytecode. Other
early-stage investigations include [150], [151], [152].
d) Fuzzing: Fuzz testing has been used to detect vul-
nerabilities in smart contracts. ContractFuzzer [46] (29) candetect five types of smart contract vulnerabilities, such as the
reentrancy vulnerability (1) and the unchecked call return
value vulnerability (15). It generates inputs by crawling theABI interfaces of smart contracts to extract their function
selectors and data types of each argument, and instruments
EVM to log contract execution behaviors for inspection. Re-
Guard [153] (30) aims to detect the reentrancy vulnerability(1) in smart contracts by transforming smart contracts tosemantically equivalent C++ program and generating random
transactions via a fuzzing engine to check the execution traces
of the C++ program.
e) Model-based vulnerability detection: Tann et al. [154]
(31) use sequence learning to detect three types of vul-nerabilities, namely the frozen Ether vulnerability (3), the
leaking Ether to arbitrary address vulnerability (11), andthe unprotected suicide vulnerability (10). Tikhomirov et al.[155] (32) propose SmartCheck to detect vulnerabilities inSolidity contracts by translating Solidity source code into an
XML-based parse-tree and checks it against specific XPath
patterns; they can detect 10 types of vulnerabilities, such as the
DoS with unexpected revert vulnerability (5), the manipulated
balance vulnerability (7), but incur a high false-positives rate.
4) Contract and Ethereum enhancement: Kosba et al. pro-
posed the Hawk [156] (33) framework for incorporatingcryptographic mechanisms to hide transaction data, effectively
allowing contract developers to build privacy-preserving smart
contracts without asking them to implement any cryptogra-
phy. This framework can be used to defend against attacks
that exploit the secrecy failure vulnerability (12) and the
transaction-ordering dependence vulnerability (24). Zhang etal. [157] (34) designed an authenticated data feed system,dubbed Town Crier, for smart contracts that require access
to external data. This system can be used to mitigate the
generating randomness vulnerability (26). Adler et al. [158](35) extended Town Crier by implementing a voting-baseddecentralized oracle to address the centralized point-of-failure
that is inherent to Town Crier. Chen [77] (36) proposed anadaptive gas cost mechanism, which dynamically adjusts the
cost of EVM operations according to their execution times, so
as to defend against DoS attacks that exploit the under-priced
opcodes vulnerability (23). In order to harden the Ethereumnetwork against eclipse attacks, Marcus et al. [35] (37)proposed a set of countermeasures for eliminating some com-
plicated artifacts of the Kademlia protocol used by Ethereum.
Wang et al. [101] (38) proposed some countermeasures fordefending Ethereum clients against the attacks that may exploit
the RPC API exposure vulnerability (38).
5) New blockchain protocols: In order to tackle the out-
sourceable puzzle vulnerability (29), Miller et al. [88] (39)formalized the notion of non-outsourceable puzzles and em-
ployed Merkle-tree-based proofs for puzzle design. The basic
idea underlying non-outsourceable puzzles is: If a pool oper-
ator outsources the mining task other miners, the miners can
collect the full credit while the pool operator gets nothing,
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which effectively disincentivizes pool operators from outsourc-
ing their mining tasks. Zeng et al. [159] (40) extended thework of [88] by proposing a non-outsourceable puzzle that
is compatible with the GHOST protocol used by Ethereum.
Daian et al. [89] (41) designed a two-stage non-outsourceablepuzzle where the outer puzzle relies on the solution to the inner
puzzle.
In order to mitigate the 51% hashrate vulnerability (30),Eyal et al. [160] (42) proposed the two-phase proof ofwork (2P-PoW) mechanism to disincentivize large mining
pools, by incorporating two separate puzzles (instead of one)
for miners to solve. Luu et al. [161] (43) implemented anew decentralized pooled mining protocol to defend against
mining centralization, by replacing the traditional mining pool
operator with an Ethereum smart contract.
B. Reactive defenses
Reactive defenses aim to react to potential exploitations
of (unknown) vulnerabilities during the contract runtime to
mitigate the damage. A runtime verification method monitors
the execution traces to detect and possibly react to suspicious
activities that may violate certain properties. DappGuard [162]
(44) actively monitors the incoming transactions to a smartcontract and leverages the aforementioned tool Oyente [63] to
decide whether or not an incoming transaction can cause a se-
curity violation and if so, a counter transaction can be invoked
to kill the contract in question. ContractLarva [163] (45)generates a new Solidity contract from the original contract
and its specification, checks the original contract’s runtime
behaviors against this new contract’s, and takes appropriate
actions in the case of any discrepancy. Sereum [40] (46)uses taint analysis to monitor runtime data flows during smart
contract execution for detecting and preventing the reentrancy
vulnerability (1).When detecting a violation, various mechanisms (47)have been proposed for mitigating the damage: (i) disabling
the vulnerable smart contract or sensitive functionalities by
using (for example) the emergency stop mechanism [164];
(ii) adopting a stake-placing mechanism to assure that any
invocation, which potentially violates some properties, should
pay a stake of compensation before running the contract and
returns the stake back to the caller after the contract terminates
normally; (iii) replacing vulnerable contracts with secure ones
using the virtual upgrade mechanism [128], which can be
realized by using a registry contract to hold the address of the
latest version of a contract or by introducing a proxy contract
to delegate calls to the latest version of a contract.
C. Further analysis based on defense capabilities
Now we present an analysis of defenses from the perspective
of defense capabilities, meaning which defense can defend
against the attacks that exploit certain vulnerabilities.
Figure 18 plots the Vern diagram of the 6 kinds of defenses
discussed above, including 5 kinds of proactive defenses (i.e.,
alternate language, contract analyzer, security enhancement,
contract best practices, blockchain protocols) and 1 kind of
reactive defenses (i.e., runtime verification). For proactive
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Fig. 18: Vern diagram representation of defenses against
attacks that exploit some of 29 vulnerabilities; note that not all
of the 44 vulnerabilities are relevant here because some vul-
nerabilities are already eliminated while other vulnerabilities
are yet to be coped with.
defense, we observe the following: (i) using contract best
practices in the course of developing contracts can prevent or
mitigate attacks that attempt to exploit 22 types of application-
layer vulnerabilities; (ii) using smart contract analyzer can
detect or mitigate attacks that attempts to exploit 18 types
of application-layer vulnerabilities; (iii) using security en-
hancement can prevent or mitigate attacks that attempts to
exploit 8 types of vulnerabilities, including 4 application-layer
vulnerabilities and 4 network-layer ones; (iv) using better-
designed contract programming language (i.e., alternate lan-
guages for short) can prevent or mitigate attacks that attempt
to exploit 6 types of application-layer vulnerabilities; (v) using
better-designed blockchain protocols can mitigate attacks that
attempt to exploit 2 types of consensus-layer vulnerabilities.
For reactive defense, we observe that using runtime verifica-
tion can mitigate attacks that attempt to exploit 4 types of
application-layer vulnerabilities. In total, proactive defenses
can defend against attacks that attempt to exploit 29 types of
vulnerabilities, whereas reactive defenses can defend attacks
that attempt to exploit 4 types of vulnerabilities, which are
also covered by proactive defenses. Moreover, we observe that
the vulnerabilities that can be defended by alternate languages
and runtime verification are subsets of the vulnerabilities that
can be defended by contract analyzers, which are in turn a
subset of the vulnerabilities that can be defended by contract
development best practices. We draw the following insights.
Insight 9: Industry has come up with a significant set of
best practices for guiding the development of smart contracts.
Insight 9 highlights the importance of adopting best prac-
tices in the process of developing software. Nevertheless, these
best practices alone are not adequate in assuring security.
Insight 10: Proactive defenses can defend against attacks
that attempt to exploit many vulnerabilities. In contrast, reac-
tive defenses can defend against attacks that attempt to exploit
a few vulnerabilities.
Insight 10 reflects the state-of-the-art. Nevertheless, reactive
defenses are still important because they may be able to defend
attacks that attempt to exploit vulnerabilities that survived
proactive defenses.
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D. Further analysis based on defense investment
Now we present an analysis of defenses from the perspective
of defense investment, meaning how much effort has been
invested in designing defense against attacks that exploit a
certain vulnerability. However, we note that some defenses
are not geared towards any specific vulnerabilities or attacks;
for example, software engineering mechanisms (i.e., 8) areneither geared towards any specific vulnerability nor geared
towards any specific attack.
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Fig. 19: The number defenses with respect to each vulnerabil-
ity.
Figure 19 plots the summary of the number of defense
mechanisms with respect to individual vulnerabilities. Table
III elaborates which vulnerabilities may be protected by which
defenses. For example, Figure 19 shows that 1 can bedefended by 17 defenses; Table III shows which these 17
defenses are. On one hand, we observe that the most exten-
sively investigated vulnerability is the reentrancy vulnerability
(1), which can be mitigated by 17 kinds of proactive andreactive defense mechanisms. Other vulnerabilities that have
been substantially investigated include: the unchecked call
return value vulnerability (15) and the transaction-ordering
dependence vulnerability (24), each of which can be defendedby 9 kinds of proactive and reactive defense mechanisms; the
frozen Ether vulnerability (3) and the timestamp dependencevulnerability (25) can be defended by 7 kinds of proactivedefense mechanisms. It appears that the vulnerabilities that
have been thoroughly investigated are (i) the ones that have
caused large financial losses, (ii) the ones that are inherent
to the design of the Solidity language, and (iii) the ones
that are inherent to the profit-making factor for assembling
blocks. This is so because the reentrancy vulnerability (1)has caused the loss of US$60M in the DAO attack (i.e.,
attack 1 in Figure 14), the frozen Ether vulnerability (3)has caused the loss of US$280M in the Parity wallet attack
(i.e., attack 3), the unchecked call return value vulnerability(15) is inherent to the exception handling mechanism inthe Solidity language, the transaction-ordering dependence
vulnerability (24) is inherent to the unpredictable natureof the Ethereum blockchain, and the timestamp dependence
vulnerability (25) is inherent to the manipulable block in-
formation of the Ethereum blockchain. On the other hand,
we observe 19 vulnerabilities that have zero or one defense
mechanism. Most of these vulnerabilities are either caused
by the Ethereum design and implementation, or reside in the
Ethereum environment. This leads to:
Insight 11: There is a large discrepancy between the effort
that has been invested to defend against attacks that exploit
different vulnerabilities.
Insight 11 is interesting because it seems that the defense
effort has been driven by the consequential financial loss
incurred by the exploitation of certain vulnerabilities. This
prioritization strategy is not adequate because it suggests in a
sense that the defender is always chasing behind the attacker,
who detects and exploits an vulnerability that then becomes
known to the defender.
Insight 12: Existing studies focus on defending against
attacks that attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the DApp back-
end (i.e., smart contracts), but largely ignore the protection of
the DApp front-end (i.e., browser) and the interactions between
the front-end and the back-end.
Insight 12 says that in order to adequately defend DApps, a
good solution should consider the front-end interface, the back-
end contracts, and their interactions. It is worth mentioning
that attacks 23, 24, 25, and 26 have exploited either thefront-end interface or the front-end and back-end interactions
to cause the loss of over US$24M in total.
VI. DISCUSSION: GOING BEYOND ETHEREUM
The preceding discussion is geared towards the Ethereum
system and offers a number of open problems for future
research. While the findings and (some of) the open problems
might be applicable to blockchain-based systems in general,
in what follows we discuss future research directions that are
equally applicable to Ethereum and blockchain-based systems.
A. Rigorous definition of properties
We observe that in order to adequately defend Ethereum
and blockchain-based systems, there is an urgent need to un-
derstand the desirable security properties, which are however
extremely difficult to formalize for a complex system like
Ethereum. Some informal properties have been discussed in
[165], which represents a very preliminary first step towards
the ultimate goal. This leads to:
Insight 13: There is a lack of deep understanding on the
rigorously-specified desirable security properties that should
be possessed by Ethereum and blockchain-based systems.
B. Rigorous analysis methodologies
Having defined the rigorous properties that should be sat-
isfied by Ethereum and blockchain-based systems, we need
principled and rigorous methodologies to analyze that the
desirable properties are indeed satisfied. For properties that
are geared towards building-blocks, cryptography and formal
methods have been two successful approaches, while noting
that they have their own limitations. Since blockchain-based
systems, such as Ethereum, as indeed complex systems, it is
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TABLE III: Elaboration of the defenses with respect to vulnerabilities summarized in Figure 19.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 total1 ✓ ✓ ✓ 32 ✓ ✓ ✓ 33 ✓ 14 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 47 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 229 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 410 ✓ ✓ ✓ 311 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 812 ✓ ✓ 213 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 414 ✓ 115 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 516 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 617 ✓ ✓ 218 ✓ 119 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 529 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 530 ✓ 131 ✓ ✓ ✓ 332 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 1033 ✓ ✓ 234 ✓ 135 ✓ 136 ✓ 137 ✓ ✓ ✓ 338 ✓ 139 ✓ 140 ✓ 141 ✓ 142 ✓ 143 ✓ 144 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 446 ✓ 1
total 17 4 7 0 3 5 4 4 5 6 3 2 1 5 9 – – 0 1 1 2 – 1 9 7 4 – – 3 2 0 0 0 1 – 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
probably infeasible to prevent all attacks, meaning that attacks
are inevitable and their risks must be adequately understood
manageable. This calls for rigorous analysis methodologies
from a holistic perspective. Towards this ultimate goal, the
recently proposed approach of cybersecurity dynamics [166],
[167], [168], [169], [170], [171], [172], [173], [174] has a
great potential, although we are not aware of any results that
have been published in the literature. This leads to:
Insight 14: There is a lack of deep understanding on
the rigorous analysis methodologies that are necessary and
sufficient for analyzing the desired properties of blockchain-
based systems.
C. Metrics
It is a notoriously difficult problem to rigorously define
metrics to systematically measure security properties of in-
terest. However, given the high likelihood that blockchain-
based systems will become digital infrastructures for the future
society, if not already, there is an urgent need to define metrics
to measure their security and risk. We are not aware of any
systematic study on this matter, despite substantial efforts
[175], [176], [177], [178], [179], [180], [181]. This leads to:
Insight 15: There is a lack of deep understanding on the
metrics that are necessary and sufficient for quantifying the
security and risk of blockchain-based systems.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a systematic survey on the security of the
Ethereum system, including its application, data, consensus,
and network layers. The survey considered three perspectives,
namely vulnerabilities, attacks and defenses, while correlating
them. We discussed not only the locations of the vulnerabil-
ities, but also their root causes. We systematized the attacks
against, and the defenses for, the Ethereum system. We further
systematized the best practices proposed by industry into a
small number of guiding principles, which might be easier to
adopt by practitioners. We provide insights into the state-of-
the-art and into future research directions.
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